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The constitutional landscape in New Zealand has undergone significant change over the last 20-
35 years to improve the transparency and accountability of decision-making in the three branches of 
government. While most of these changes are a direct result of legislation, the constitutional role of the 
court has also been evolving and has seen the development of judicial review of the substance of the law 
for consistency with the New Zealand constitution.  The orthodox view of the constitution is heavily 
critical of judicial, or constitutional, review of legislation by the courts and considers it to be an 
illegitimate encroachment on the domain of Parliament. 
This paper explores the legitimacy of constitutional review of legislation by the courts, 
specifically constitutional review of legislation under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill 
of Rights Act).  To be legitimate, constitutional review by the courts must have both legal authority and 
be performed consistently with the constitution.  This paper observes that s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 
has been employed by the courts, without interference from Parliament, to review legislation for 
consistency with that Act and that the courts use the purposive approach to interpretation and the 
proportionality analysis to perform such review consistently with the constitution.  Finally, the paper 
explores whether the developing jurisdiction of constitutional review necessitates a new paradigm to 
define the constitutional relationship between the courts and Parliament because the orthodox view of 
New Zealand’s constitution is no longer supportable as the definitive position.   
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 35,650 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION  
New Zealand’s constitution is a creature of “pragmatic evolution”,1 and it is no 
surprise that the New Zealand constitution has evolved to accommodate the courts to 
performing constitutional review of legislation under the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (the Bill of Rights Act).2  Constitutional review under the Bill of Rights Act 
is legitimate not only by virtue of the legal authority for it conferred by s 5 of the Bill 
of Rights Act but also because the courts perform it consistently with the New Zealand 
constitution.  Constitutional review under the Bill of Rights Act is holding its ground 
despite the challenges it presents to the orthodox view of the constitution suggesting it 
is timely for a new paradigm to describe the constitutional relationship between the 
courts and Parliament is necessary. 
The orthodox view of the relationship between Parliament and the courts places 
Parliament as the ultimate lawmaker and restricts the courts’ role to that of interpreting 
and applying the law specifically excluding the ability of the courts to examine the 
substance of the law.  However, changes to New Zealand’s constitutional landscape 
over the last 35 years make the continuation of the orthodox position untenable.  Many 
of these changes have occurred as a result of legislative change such as the 
establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, the 
founding of ombudsmen under the Ombudsmen Act 1975, the introduction of official 
information requests under the Official Information Act 1982, the enactment of the Bill 
of Rights Act, a new electoral system of mixed member proportional enacted through 
the Electoral Act 1993, and the establishment of the Supreme Court of New Zealand by 
the Supreme Court Act 2003.  These legislative changes have introduced greater 
transparency and accountability mechanisms for ensuring the good governance of New 
Zealand. 
Constitutional change has occurred not only in the executive and legislative 
branches of the government; the constitutional role of the courts has also had to evolve 
over the last 35 years to accommodate these changes, especially in the field of judicial 
review.  In 1998, Philip Joseph identified three new grounds of judicial review for 
claims under: the Treaty of Waitangi, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and 
                                                 
1 Constitutional Arrangements Committee Inquiry to Review New Zealand’s Existing Constitutional 
Arrangements: Report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee (2005) AJHR I.24A [Inquiry to 
Review New Zealand’s Existing Constitutional Arrangements]. 
2 For the purposes of this paper the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is referred to as the “Bill of 
Rights Act”; however, in some quotes it may be referred to as “BORA” or a variation. 
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international human rights instruments to which New Zealand was a party.3 Joseph 
characterises this form of judicial review as “constitutional review” because it involves 
substantive review of a decision and the grounds are inherently constitutional.4 
Furthermore, Joseph identifies the proportionality test as the touchstone of judicial 
analysis of constitutional review.5  In relation to the Bill of Rights Act, Joseph observes 
that the Act: “mandates constitutional adjudication.  In applying s 5 (the “justified 
limitations” section), the Court of Appeal has identified the methodology essentially of 
constitutional review.”6  Constitutional review challenges orthodox views of the 
relationship between Parliament and the courts because it invites the courts to examine 
the substance of the law.  While Joseph’s article focused on administrative decision-
making7 there are now clear examples of the expansion of constitutional review into 
legislation for consistency with the Bill of Rights Act.8  Joseph discussion of 
constitutional review is used to guide the analysis of constitutional review of legislation 
in this paper. 
While this paper does not seek to answer the expansive question of “in what 
direction should New Zealand’s constitution be heading?” it intends to contribute to 
this broader discussion by exploring the evolving constitutional role of the courts in 
relation to constitutional review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act.  To be 
legitimate, constitutional review by the courts must have both legal authority and be 
performed consistently with New Zealand’s constitution.  This paper establishes that 
constitutional review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act is not only legitimate, 
but also fast becoming an essential part of our constitutional culture.  For example, both 
the legislative and executive branches of government acknowledge the growing role of 
constitutional review of legislation by the courts and have not sought to curtail it 
through corrective legislation but instead are employing the courts’ analytical methods 
to inform policy and law-making.  To this end, the developing jurisdiction of 
constitutional review necessitates a new paradigm to define the constitutional 
relationship between the courts and Parliament in New Zealand because the orthodox 
view is no longer supportable as the definitive position.   
                                                 
3 Philip Joseph “Constitutional Review Now” [1998] NZ Law Review 85; see also Philip Joseph 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at 21.11 
[“Constitutional and Administrative Law”]. 
4 Joseph “Constitutional Review Now”, above n 3, at 90. 
5 Joseph “Constitutional Review Now”, above n 3, at 91. 
6 Joseph “Constitutional Review Now”, above n 3, at 125. 
7 Joseph “Constitutional Review Now”, above n 3, at 126. 
8 See Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7 [Hansen] and R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA). 
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Before examining the changing constitutional role of the courts in light of 
constitutional review under the Bill of Rights Act it is helpful to set out some context 
about New Zealand’s constitution, the orthodox view of the relationship between 
Parliament and the courts, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hansen v R9 (Hansen) 
which will be used as a case study for this paper and constitutional review. 
A New Zealand’s constitution 
The nature of New Zealand’s constitution is pertinent because it is the 
benchmark against which the activities of the courts, in performing constitutional 
review, are measured.  In New Zealand, the constitution is not found in a single written 
legal document, like that of the United States of America.  Instead, as described by the 
Constitutional Arrangements Committee, New Zealand’s constitution is “partly written 
and wholly uncodified”.10  New Zealand constitution is a network of legislation, case 
law, common law, and conventions that operate together to govern New Zealand.  
Joseph, in the seminal text on constitutional law in New Zealand: Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in New Zealand, describes constitutional law as being “concerned 
with the history, structure, and functioning of central government carried on in 
accordance with the law, constitutional convention and the expectations of liberal 
democratic government.”11   
1 Orthodox view of New Zealand’s constitution 
The orthodox view of New Zealand’s constitution is heavily based on the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  The authoritative description of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is attributed to Dicey who describes it as:12 
 
… Parliament … [having], under the English constitution, the right to make or 
unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised 
by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation. 
 
While Dicey and his peers, such as Thomas Hobbes of Magdalen and William 
Blackstone, were deciphering the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in the late 19th 
                                                 
9 Hansen, above n 8. 
10 Constitutional Arrangements Committee Inquiry to review New Zealand’s existing constitutional 
arrangements, above n 1, at 84. 
11 Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law, above n 3, at 1. 
12 A V Dicey An introduction to the study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, Macmillan, United 
Kingdom, 1996) at 38. 
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century, the seeds of this doctrine are perceivable in the Bill of Rights 1688.13  The Bill 
of Rights 1688 is the legal reflection of an historical and political event: the English 
Revolution in 1688 (also referred to as the “Glorious Revolution”) which is said to 
have: “swept aside any limitation on parliamentary power” placing the substantial 
power in the hands of Parliament rather than the Sovereign.14 
The Bill of Rights 1688 remains part of the laws of New Zealand by virtue of s 
3(1) and sch 1 of the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988.  Article 1 (Dispensing 
power) of the Bill of Rights 1688, which states that: “the pretended power of 
suspending of laws or the execution of laws by Regall Authority without the consent of 
Parlyament is illegall”, places the power to suspend or execute laws in the hands of 
Parliament.  Similarly, art 13 (Frequent Parlyaments) of the Bill of Rights 1688 states 
that: “[a]nd for the redresse of all grievances and for the amending, strengthening and 
preserveing of the lawes Parlyaments ought to be held frequently” places the 
responsibility of amending law in the hands of Parliament.  The context in which the 
Bill of Rights 1688 was enacted is an essential feature of the document and directly 
informs its purpose: it was aimed at redressing the power imbalance between the 
Sovereign and the people as represented by Parliament.  
A more modern example can be found in s 15 of the Constitution Act 1986, 
which states that: “The Parliament of New Zealand continues to have full power to 
make laws.”  As with the articles of the Bill of Rights 1688, the words alone of s 15 of 
the Constitution Act are insufficient to determine the extent to which it legislates for 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and seems, by virtue of the word “continues”, 
to rely on a pre-existing notion of the powers attributable to Parliament.   
New Zealand inherited this doctrine through the English law heritage that forms 
the basis of New Zealand’s legal system.  While in the United Kingdom, the Bill of 
Rights 1688 is the result of historical events shaping its legal, political, and 
constitutional skeleton; McHugh observes that “the settler policy of New Zealand took 
Dicey’s position and moulded it into an essentially ahistorical, highly idealised, not to 
say patriarchal, sense of constitutional being.”15   
There is a vast body of academic writing about the nature of the doctrine and 
whether, for example, the doctrine is a political fact, rule of recognition, grundnorm, 
common law doctrine, or combination of these things. Some interpretations of the 
                                                 
13 Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law, above n 3, at 488. 
14 Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law, above n 3, at 498. 
15 P G McHugh “Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown Sovereignty in New Zealand” (2002) 52 
University of Toronto Law Journal 69 at 71. 
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doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty consider it to be separate from “legislative 
supremacy”.  For example, Andrew Butler in “The Bill of Rights Debate: Why the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is a Bad Model for Britain”, draws a distinction 
between parliamentary sovereignty and legislative supremacy:16 
 
Simply put, supremacy of legislation is the principle that all legislation shall be 
regarded as valid and that none may be set aside by the courts. It will be clear 
that the New Zealand Bill is based on a rigid version of this principle: under s4 
all legislation is exempt from challenges based on human rights norms. By 
contrast, parliamentary sovereignty is the principle that Parliament is the apex 
of the constitutional structure: it is the source of supreme law and has ultimate 
power to determine what will and what will not be law.  
 
The orthodox view combines the concept of legislative supremacy (that 
Parliament alone can make or unmake any law, and that no person can override or set 
aside legislation) with the position that Parliament is the ultimate lawmaker and has 
unlimited law making powers.  In addition, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy 
provides that Parliament cannot bind its successors.  In the legal context, this restriction 
has resulted in the useful development of the doctrine of implied repeal by the courts.  
The doctrine of implied repeal provides that if there contradictory provisions are 
present then the more recent legislation overrides the earlier legislation.  In the political 
context, the doctrine has posed practical challenges for Parliament, particularly when 
trying to entrench legislation or, more controversially, when Parliament is seeking to 
limit its sovereign power.17  The doctrine has also posed practical difficulties for the 
courts when reviewing legislation for consistency with constitutional law and has 
resulted in the courts developing the principle of legality for constitutional statutes 
requiring Parliament to expressly repeal constitutional legislation as a counterweight to 
the doctrine of implied repeal otherwise. 
The orthodox view takes the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty one step 
further again and asserts that review of legislation by the courts is undemocratic 
because judges are not elected representatives of the people; and, therefore, judicial 
review of legislation undermines parliamentary sovereignty.  For example, Ekins 
considers that even in countries that restrict legislative power under their constitution 
                                                 
16 Andrew Butler “The Bill of Rights Debate: Why the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is a Bad 
Model for Britain” (1997) 17 OJLS 323, 340 [“The Bill of Rights Debate”]. 
17 See generally Richard Ekins, “The Authority of Parliament. A reply to Professor Joseph” (2005) 16 
KCLJ 51 [“The Authority of Parliament”]. 
 
10 
and permit judges to strike down law, judicial review of legislation is undemocratic.18  
In effect, the orthodox view adds two elements to the doctrine: that Parliament has 
illimitable powers to legislation (emphasis is placed on the ability of Parliament to 
make or unmake any laws) and that the courts cannot review the substance of the law 
because this is the exclusive dominion of Parliament.   
Despite the assuredness with which the doctrine has been observed, there is 
debate about the extent to which the doctrine is absolute and whether there are other 
elements or restrictions to this doctrine. There are some of the practical restrictions on 
the doctrine because while Parliament could, in theory, enact laws beyond its 
territory,19 and reclaim the power to legislate for former dominions for which it has 
renounced its legislative competence20 - such laws would have no practical effect.  
Another practical restriction on the doctrine is that Parliament would not enact laws 
that were repugnant such as introducing racial or religious discrimination in a way that 
made people unequal.21 This restriction is political, rather than legal and, hence the 
“cannot” should possibly be replaced with “would not”.  Elliot describes them as 
“inhibitions” rather than restrictions and observes that: “the theory of parliamentary 
sovereignty errs by ascribing unlimited lawmaking power to an institution that is 
constrained … by the dictates of political reality.”22 This proposition is controversial 
because it steps away from the orthodox view and suggests that Parliament does face 
restrictions on its power to legislation.  An equally controversial issue is whether, 
Parliament can choose, because of the inherent power of parliamentary sovereignty, to 
forgo the protection of legislative supremacy for some legislation.23 
Constitutional review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act, which 
necessarily involves examination of the substance of the law, runs afoul of the orthodox 
view.  However, it does not run afoul of the legislative supremacy kernel of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty because constitutional review of legislation under 
the Bill of Rights Act does encourage the courts seeking to usurp the democratic role of 
Parliament to determine policy and enact law to give effect to that policy. 
                                                 
18 Ekins “The Authority of Parliament”, above n 17, at 66. 
19 Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law, above n 3, at 14.4.4. 
20 For example, Parliament cannot take back legislative competence for a country or territory that it has 
renounced.  The United Kingdom has also devolved some legislative and administrative decision-making 
to Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland: Northern Ireland Act 1998, Government of Wales Act 1998, 
and Scotland Act 1998.  
21 Mark Elliot “United Kingdom: parliamentary sovereignty under pressure” (2004) 2 Int’l Journal of 
Constitutional Law 545 at 546-547. 
22 Ibid, at 546-547. 
23 A Bulter, “The Bill of Rights Debate”, above n 16, at 340. 
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2 Constitutional realist view of New Zealand’s constitution 
While the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is accepted as a core element of 
our constitutional arrangements it is only part of it and is, arguably, modified by other 
aspects of New Zealand’s constitution.  In contrast to the orthodox view supplied by 
Dicey and adopted by colonial New Zealand, Matthew Palmer describes a constitution 
in the following constitutional realist terms:24 
 
A constitution is about public power and how it is exercised.  A constitution is 
not just a document.  …  A constitution is made up of structures, processes, 
principles, rules, conventions and even culture that constitute the ways in 
which government power is exercised. 
 
In a separate article on constitutional culture, Matthew Palmer identifies three 
values of New Zealand’s constitutional culture that influence the New Zealand 
constitution: egalitarianism, authoritarianism and pragmatism.25  These values are 
connected to four fundamental norms that Palmer considers underpins the New Zealand 
constitution: representative democracy, parliamentary sovereignty, rule of law and 
judicial independence, and the constitution as an unwritten evolving way of doing 
things.26  These values and norms are used to inform the analysis in this paper. 
Palmer has also observed that: “a constitution continually exists in the actions, 
understandings and inter-relationships of those who operate it.”1 This description is true 
of New Zealand’s partly written and uncodified constitution.  The executive, legislative 
and judicial branches of government have adapted as a result of the enactment of the 
Bill of Rights Act.  The executive and legislative branches made changes to procedures 
in the Cabinet Manual and Standing Orders to give effect to the reporting function of 
the Attorney-General under s 7 of the Bill of Rights Act, and the courts have adapted 
interpretation and review practices to give effect to the rights in the Bill of Rights Act.  
The constitutional arrangements also respond to those who use it to contest its 
workings. In practical terms, if a person or group of people disagree with a law then 
they can challenge it by lobbying members of Parliament for change, making a 
submission to a parliamentary select committee, changing voting preferences at an 
election, or advocating through the courts.  The last form of challenge is not without 
                                                 
24 Matthew Palmer “What is New Zealand’s constitution and who interprets it? Constitutional realism 
and the importance of public office-holders” (2006) 17 Public Law Review 133 at 134 [“What is New 
Zealand’s constitution”]. 
25 Matthew Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional Culture” (2007) 22 NZULR 564 at 575-578. 
26 Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional Culture”, above n 25, at 578-593. 
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controversy.  Review of legislation by the courts presents a challenge to orthodox view 
because review of legislation has traditionally been the domain of Parliament under the 
auspices of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and representative democracy.  
Constitutional review by the courts expands the options for challenging legislation and 
policy thereby providing a new democratic avenue for the public. 
This paper takes a practical and commonsensical approach to assess whether the 
legal authority and performance of constitutional review under the Bill of Rights Act is 
consistent with the constitution, including the formal standard set by the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Because a constitutional realist lens invites us to look 
beyond the doctrines to the contributions made by different participants in the 
constitutional setting (such as members of Parliament, judicial decisions, officials, 
lawyers, academics, and the public) this paper will also look to these contributions in 
examining constitutional review under the Bill of Rights Act. 
B An introduction to Hansen 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hansen has been selected as the focus for this 
paper because it involves review of a legislative provision by the courts and it is the 
definitive case for clarifying that courts have a role in reviewing legislation for 
consistency with the Bill of Rights Act.  The following paragraphs summarise the 
decision in Hansen to provide necessary context for the analysis in this paper.   
In Hansen the Supreme Court deliberated whether s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1975 could be read consistently with the Bill of Rights Act by virtue of s 6 of the 
Bill of Rights Act.  Section 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act states that an accused who 
is found in possession of controlled drugs above a prescribed limit is deemed “until the 
contrary is proved” to be in possession of that drug for the purposes of sale or supply of 
that drug.  This presumption places the onus on the accused to prove that, on the 
balance of probabilities, he or she did not intend to sell or supply the drugs to others: it 
is a “reverse onus” provision.  Section 6 of the Misuse of Drugs Act makes it an 
offence to possess a controlled drug for use, sale, or supply and subs (6) states: 
 
(6) For the purposes of subsection (1)(f), a person is presumed until the 
contrary is proved to be in possession of a controlled drug for any of the 
purposes in subsection (1)(c), (d), or (e) if he or she is in possession of the 
controlled drug in an amount, level, or quantity at or over which the controlled 




The argument advanced by the counsel for Mr Hansen was that s 6(6) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act is inconsistent with the right to be presumed innocent protected 
under s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act and that it could be interpreted under s 6 of the 
Bill of Rights Act with a lesser burden.  Section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act states: 
 
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination 
of the charge, the following minimum rights: 
[…] 
 (c) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law: 
 
The appeal was dismissed and separate judgments were issued setting out the 
reasons.  Three judges (Tipping J, McGrath J, and Anderson J) found that s 6(6) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act was an unjustified limit on the right to be presumed innocent 
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act and that no consistent meaning could be established 
under s 6 of that Act; therefore, the provision had to stand by virtue of s 4 of the Bill of 
Rights Act which provides that an enactment cannot be overridden if it inconsistent 
with any provision of the Bill of Rights Act.  While each of these judges came to the 
same conclusion there are differences to the approach each judge took to analysing the 
issues. 
Elias CJ also found that there was no consistent meaning available under s 6 of 
the Bill of Rights Act but the Chief Justice took a different approach to applying the 
Bill of Rights Act akin to that of Cooke P in Ministry of Transport v Noort (Noort)27 
and concluded that s 5 did not have a role to play in Hansen.  Blanchard J, on the other 
hand, took the view that the limit imposed on the right by s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs 
Act was justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
While the majority found that s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act was not a 
justified limit, could not be given a meaning consistent with the Bill of Rights Act, and 
applied s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act; none of these judgments issued a declaration of 
inconsistency. The decision in Hansen offers an opportunity to examine how the 
Supreme Court reviews legislation under the Bill of Rights Act and whether such 
review is legitimate. 
                                                 
27 Ministry of Transport v Noort (Police v Curran) [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) [Noort]. 
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C Legitimacy of constitutional review of legislation  
Constitutional review by the courts is a relative newcomer to the legal scene.  
Many countries, especially in Europe, adopted a centralised institutional model for 
constitutional review by the courts that is prescribed by their constitution or legislation 
after World War I and World War II.28 In contrast, the United States of America has 
had a form of constitutional review for more than 200 years.29 The term “constitutional 
review” in literature in other jurisdictions is used in an almost unconscious way; this 
means that the reader relies on the context to derive what authors mean when referring 
to constitutional review. 30  
In the New Zealand context, the term “constitutional review” has been 
employed to refer to a new form of judicial review that employs the proportionality test 
to review substantive matters under the auspices of the Treaty of Waitangi, Bill of 
Rights Act, and international human rights conventions. 31   Beyond Joseph’s writing, 
there is limited reference to the concept of constitutional review of legislation in New 
Zealand literature; instead the focus of the literature has been about the application of s 
5 of the Bill of Rights Act to legislation and judicial review of administrative 
decisions.32  What is evident from the literature is that there are two aspects for 
determining the legitimacy of constitutional review: the nature of the legal authority for 
such review, and that the courts must perform constitutional review consistently with 
the constitution.   
There are differing views about whether constitutional review by the courts is 
constitutional. Review of legislation by the courts is seen by some as unconstitutionally 
challenging the policy and law-making dominion of Parliament because the judicial 
                                                 
28 The following countries adopted a centralised model of constitutional review after one or both of the 
World Wars: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.  
29 Marbury v Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803) was the case in which the United States Supreme Court 
determined that the power to review legislation could be derived from the United States Constitution. 
30 The term judicial review of legislation is also referred to in the literature and appears to be manifestly 
the same as constitutional review of legislation where the values concerned are constitutional in nature, 
and sometimes the terms are used interchangeably. See Dimitrios Kyritsis  “Representation and 
Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review” (2006) 26 Oxford J Legal Stud 733. 
31 Joseph “Constitutional Review Now”, above n 2; see also Joseph Constitutional and Administrative 
Law, above n 2 at 21.11. 
32 See generally Andrew Butler “Judicial Indications of Inconsistency – a New Weapon in the Bill of 
Rights Armoury?” (2000) NZLR 43 [“Judicial Indications of Inconsistency”]; Petra Butler “Human 
Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty in New Zealand” (2004) 35 VUWLR 341; Professor F M 
Brookfield “Constitutional Law” [1992] NZ Recent Law Review 231; Alex Conte and Sarah Wynn-
Williams “Declarations of inconsistency under the Bill of Rights. Part I: judicial jurisdiction, discretion 
or obligation?” (2003) 6(3) Human Rights Law & Practice 243 [“Declarations of inconsistency”]; Alex 
Conte “Declarations of inconsistency under the Bill of Rights. Part II: an "effective remedy"? (2003) 6(3) 
Human Rights Law & Practice 256; and Paul Rishworth “Human Rights and Bill of Rights” [1996] NZ 
Law Review 298. 
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analysis examines the value and importance of the public purpose the legislation is 
seeking to achieve and, ultimately, where the balance of public interest or welfare lies 
with the right or with the offending legislative provision.33  These are seen as activities 
that belong to members of Parliament as the elected representatives of the public and 
any encroachment undermines parliamentary sovereignty. This paper concludes that 
constitutional review under the Bill of Rights Act in New Zealand is legitimate by 
examining the legal authority for constitutional review provided by section 5 of the Bill 
of Rights Act (chapter II) and how the courts exercise that jurisdiction in practice using 
Hansen as a case study (chapter III). Finally, this paper looks to the viable alternatives 
to the orthodox view for describing the constitutional relationship between Parliament 
and the courts (chapter IV).  
 
                                                 
33 See generally Ekins “The Authority of Parliament”, above n 17. 
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II LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
To examine the legal authority of constitutional review, this chapter poses two 
questions about the legal authority for such review: can review of legislation be 
performed under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act and is review of legislation under the Bill 
of Rights Act constitutional review?  Before commencing this assessment it is helpful 
to look at constitutional review in other jurisdictions to identify the core features of the 
legal authority. 
A Models of legal authority for constitutional review 
The legal authority for constitutional review of legislation in other jurisdictions, 
especially in non-common law jurisdictions, is usually found in their constitution or 
legislation and that authority sets out: 
• who can perform constitutional review of legislation (for example, some 
jurisdictions establish a specialist constitutional court or reserve this 
power for a supreme court) 
• the circumstances in which it can be performed (for example, abstract 
review of legislation or review in specific cases or both) 
• the extent of the courts’ powers (for example, whether they can strike 
down inconsistent legislation). 
 
The European centralised model of constitutional review of legislation is 
described in the following terms: 34 
 
Most European countries have established special constitutional courts that are 
uniquely empowered to set aside legislation that runs counter to their 
constitutions.  Typically, such constitutional courts review legislation in the 
abstract, with no connection to an actual controversy. 
 
Comella’s description above focuses on the institution carrying out constitutional 
review (“special constitutional courts”), authority for this review (“established” and 
“empowered”), when judges can exercise that power (when “legislation … runs counter 
to their constitutions” and “courts review legislation in the abstract”), the standards 
                                                 
34 Victor Ferreres Comella “The European model of constitutional review of legislation: toward 
decentralisation?” (2004) 2(3) I CON at 461 [“The European Model of constitutional review”]. 
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against which legislation is assessed (“their constitutions”), and the remedies the court 
can apply (“set aside legislation”). 
Similarly, Alexy, in the context of designing a formula for balancing competing 
interests in cases, describes constitutional review in Europe as “an expression of the 
priority or superpriority of constitutional rights over and against parliamentary 
legislation.”35  Alexy then goes on to unpack constitutional review further: 36 
 
Constitutional review, however, consists of more than assertions concerning 
constitutionality.  The constitutional court not only says something but also 
does something.  It typically has power to invalidate unconstitutional acts of 
the parliament.  This kind of participation in legislation means that the activity 
of constitutional courts has not only a propositional or discursive character but 
also an institutional or authoritative one. 
 
Alexy’s descriptions of constitutional review contain the same elements of Comella’s 
description: institution, authority, method, standard and remedy. These examples 
reflect the legal culture of the centralised model of constitutional review where 
constitutional review is expressly permitted by a constitution or legislation, and that 
certain powers are conferred on judges to carry it out.   
In contrast, the model of constitutional review in the United States of America 
(United States) reveals that authority for constitutional review does not have to be 
expressly conferred on the courts by the Legislature.  Jurisdiction for constitutional 
review was not expressly conferred by the United States Constitution but has, 
nevertheless, been derived from it.37  Comella describes the approach taken in the 
United States as a decentralised model because all courts have the ability to determine 
the constitutional validity of a statute and they determine it in the context of a specific 
cases rather than abstract review of legislation.38  Further, Comella considers that this 
approach is sustainable in a common law system by virtue of the doctrine of precedent 
that means that lower courts are bound to follow the decisions of higher courts. 39 
In other common law countries there have been a variety of approaches; for 
example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Canadian Charter)40 
                                                 
35 Robert Alexy “Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation” 3 Int’l J Const L 572 at 577. 
36 Alexy “Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation”, above n 35, at 577. 
37 Marbury v Madison, above n 29. 
38 Comella “The European model of constitutional review”, above n 34, at 461 and 466. 
39 Comella “The European model of constitutional review”, above n 34, at 461 and 466. 
40 Canada Act 1982 (UK) RS C 1982 Schedule B, Part 1. 
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permits the courts to strike down legislation that is inconsistent with the rights 
contained in the Charter, whereas the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 does 
not empower the courts to strike down legislation but does permit the courts to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility if legislation is inconsistent with the rights in that Act 
There is no consistent approach to how the legal authority for constitutional 
review of legislation is conferred with the type of authority varying according to the 
legal system. For example, it and be carefully prescribed by legislation or in a 
constitution (such as in Spain), it may be generally conferred (such as in Canada and 
the United Kingdom) or it may be interpreted as part of the constitution by the courts 
(as in the United States).  The common thread is that the authority for constitutional 
review of legislation permits judicial review of legislation to determine whether the 
legislation is consistent with the constitution or a set of constitutional standards such as 
human rights. 
B Legal authority for review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act 
One way in which the legal authority for review of legislation has been 
conferred on the courts is through legislation; sometimes that authority is detailed and 
in others it is generally conferred.  The approach of New Zealand courts has been to 
review legislation for consistency with the Bill of Rights Act under s 5 of that Act; 
there has however been debate, including in minority judgments such as those of Chief 
Justice Elias in Hansen and Cooke P in Noort, about whether s 5 does confer this 
authority.  While the majority in Hansen reviewed s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, s 5 and the Bill of Rights Act are silent about when, 
and by whom, s 5 should be used.  Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act states: 
 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in 
this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act reflects the position that rights are not absolute: 41 
 
[Section 5] reflects the reality that rights do not exist in a vacuum, that they 
may be modified in the public interest to take account of the rights of others 
                                                 
41 Noort, above n 27, at 283 per Richardson J.  See also Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent’s case) 




and the interests of the whole community.  Equally clearly s 5 guards those 
rights by insisting that they may be regarded as modified only where the 
stringent tests laid down are met. 
 
Section 5 applies to limits and requires any limits on the rights and freedoms 
contained in the Bill of Rights Act to be: reasonable, prescribed by law, demonstrable, 
and justifiable.  A limit is a restriction that impinges on a right or freedom and can 
come in any form such as legislation, policies, decisions, activities and practices that 
are prescribed by the law.  The limit must be created or performed by a person or 
organisation captured by s 3 of the Bill of Rights Act.42  In order to avail itself of s 5 of 
the Bill of Rights Act the limit must be prescribed by law.43  Setting out rules, benefits, 
and obligations in legislation is one of the ways in which the law is prescribed.  
Therefore, legislative provisions, such as s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act, are 
captured by s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act because they are capable of posing a limit on a 
right that is prescribed by law and an act of the legislative branch of the government. 
The question of whether the courts could review legislation under the Bill of 
Rights Act was an early topic of debate.  In 1992, the Court of Appeal in Noort 
considered whether the actions of police officers in roadside alcohol screening could be 
interpreted to enable motorists to contact a lawyer consistently with s 23(1)(b) of the 
Bill of Rights Act.44  The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the provisions of 
the Transport Act 1962 did not pose a limit on the Bill of Rights Act because that 
roadside alcohol screening could be performed consistently with s 23(1)(b) of the Bill 
of Rights Act.  In coming to this decision four of the five judges took that opportunity 
to describe an analytical framework for assessing the rights breaches under the Bill of 
Rights Act, the courts’ role, and application of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
Richardson and Hardie-Boys JJ in Noort both signal that the courts have a role 
to play in determining whether statutory provisions are justified under s 5 of the Bill of 
Rights Act.  Richardson J demonstrates the courts’ role through his analysis, while 
Hardie-Boys J expressly states: 45 
                                                 
42 Section 3 of the Bill of Rights Act states: This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done— (a) By the 
legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New Zealand; or (b) By any person or 
body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or 
body by or pursuant to law. 
43 Hansen, above n 8, at [180] per McGrath J. See generally Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at 6.13. 
44 Section 23(1)(b) of the Bill of Rights Act states that: “Everyone who is arrested or who is detained 
under any enactment … [s]hall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and to be 
informed of that right.” 




To view the matter in this way is no arrogation by the Court of the 
responsibility of determining what is a reasonable limit, and what can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  Rather it is to see s 5 
as a mechanism to secure recognition of the Act’s rights and freedoms to the 
fullest extent that is reasonable and practicable in the statutory context. 
 
In contrast to this position, two judgments in Noort considered that the court did 
not have a role to play under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  The two main objections 
were that s 5 is targeted at the legislative and executive branches not the courts and that 
s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act precludes judicial consideration of limits.  The discourse of 
Cooke P and Gault J in Noort precluding judicial consideration of limits under s 5 of 
the Bill of Rights Act is rarely repeated in later cases and does not reflect the prevalent 
application of the s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  The noteworthy exception to this 
approach is Elias CJ’s judgment in Hansen.  Given the challenge these positions pose 
to the legal authority for constitutional review by the courts, these two objections are 
discussed below. 
1 Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act targeted at Legislature and Executive 
An interpretation of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act is that it is targeted at the 
legislative and executive branches of the government, not at the courts.  In issuing his 
dissenting judgment in Noort, Gault J contrasts s 5 with the s 1 of the Canadian Charter 
and states:46 
 
Section 5 clearly serves a different role in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
than does s 1 of the Canadian Charter.  It seems rather directed to the role of 
the Attorney-General under s 7. It may assist in a conflict between common 
law rules and the fundamental rights but I can see no part for it to play in cases 
of statutory inconsistency.  
 
Elias CJ in Hansen draws on the legislative scheme of the Bill of Rights Act as 
evidence of a non-judicial purpose for s 5: 47 
 
As s 3 makes clear, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is directed not only at 
those interpreting and applying the enacted rights and freedoms. Section 5 is 
                                                 
46 Noort, above n 27, at 295 per Gault J (dissenting); and at 271 per Cooke P. 
47 Hansen, above n 8, at [23] per Elias CJ. 
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directed to those making or advising on the making of legal prescriptions 
potentially limiting of Part 2 rights and freedoms.  In addition, as indicated, s 5 
may give rise to a substantive determination of compliance. 
 
This construction of the purpose of s 5 by Elias CJ would have s 5 apply only to 
Bills and draft legislation not to the law once enacted.  This interpretation is 
incongruous with the concept of “limit” that is captured by s 5 which includes 
legislation is because it is capable of imposing a limit on a right.   
Section 5 is silent about who is to apply s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  In 
contrast to s 5, ss 4 and 7 of the Bill of Rights Act contain express statements about to 
whom they apply.  Section 4 specifically refers to the fact that no court shall, in 
essence, render legislation invalid or refuse to apply it.  Section 7 is an instruction to 
the Attorney-General to bring to Bills and provisions inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights Act to the attention of the House of Representatives.   
The Bill of Rights Act, by virtue of s 3, applies to the three branches of 
Government (Executive, Legislature, and the Judiciary) requiring them to affirm, 
protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in the exercise of their 
functions.  The way the Bill of Rights Act applies to each branch varies according to 
the role each branch plays in governing New Zealand.  This means that public office-
holders, including those providing public services in the private sector, must act 
consistently with the rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights Act unless there is a 
justification for limiting a right. 
While s 5, like s 6, is silent about to who applies it; s 3 of the Bill of Rights Act 
makes it clear that the Act applies to the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
government (and to those performing public functions as per s 3(b) of the Bill of Rights 
Act) and it is consistent with the scheme and purpose of the Act to conclude that the 
courts can review legislation under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  Furthermore, the 
courts have come to this conclusion as is reflected in the majority decisions in Hansen. 
2 Section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act precludes review of legislation  
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act opens with the statement “subject to section 
4” and this statement has been interpreted to exclude review of legislation by the courts 
under s 5 of that Act.   Section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act states:  
 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or 
after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),— 
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(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, 
or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment— 
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill 
of Rights. 
 
Cooke P in Noort notes that s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act is subject to s 4, and 
then relies on s 4 as precluding review of legislation if an enactment is inconsistent 
with the Bill of Rights Act.48  In contrast, academic writing on the Bill of Rights Act at 
the same time supported judicial review of legislation.  For example, Brookfield notes 
Cooke P’s statement in Noort about the limited use of s 5 but proposes that the courts 
can examine justified limitations under s 5 because he considers that such examination 
is not precluded by s 4 but that the wording actually leaves this possibility open:49 
 
The essential point is that it is assumed, in the prohibition directed to the courts 
in s 4, that they may hear argument not only about the nature and definition of 
the rights and freedoms in Part II but also about justified limitations under s 5. 
 
Despite Cooke P’s position in Noort, subsequent cases saw the courts employ s 5 to 
analyse limits (legislative or otherwise) on the rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights 
Act.  However, Elias CJ in Hansen observes that: 50 
 
The sequence suggested by which consideration of justification under s 5 is a 
necessary step in determining whether an enactment is consistent with a right 
under Part 2, would set up a soft form of judicial review of legislation which 
seems inconsistent with s 4 of the Act.   
 
In support of this conclusion Elias CJ considers the legislative history of the 
Bill of Rights Act and late inclusion of s 4 to exclude the ability to strike down 
legislation as removing the courts’ requirement to review legislation under s 5 of the 
Act.51  Again, this narrow interpretation would result in s 5 applying only to draft 
legislation and this approach seems incongruous to the concept of “limit” in s 5 of the 
Bill of Rights Act that includes instruments and activities prescribed by law.  
                                                 
48 Noort, above n 27, at 271 per Cooke P.  
49 Brookfield “Constitutional Law”, above n 32, at 239. 
50 Hansen, above n 8, at [6] per Elias CJ. 
51 Ibid, at [19] per Elias CJ.  
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Furthermore, s 4 uses the term “inconsistent”; whether a limit is inconsistent with the 
Bill of Rights Act is determined by analysis under s 5 of that Act.   
The approach preferred by the courts, however, appears to be that the 
qualification “subject to section 4” goes to the outcome of the analysis: that even if an 
inconsistency is found s 4 means that the offending provision prevails: 52 
 
Subject only to the application of s 5, which concerns justified limitations, the 
effect of s 4 is that any inconsistent legislation prevails over the Bill of Rights, 
irrespective of when it is enacted, to the extent of the inconsistency.  Section 4 
thereby reaffirms the primacy of the legislature and makes clear that the 
courts’ role in applying the Bill of Rights in ascertaining the meaning of 
legislation remains one of interpretation within the limits of the legislative 
directions specified in that Act. 
 
An alternative reading of Elias CJ position is that she does not consider that s 5 
of the Bill of Rights Act imposes a duty on the courts to review legislation; this 
alternative reading is plausible, in light of her discussion in the judgment that s 5 may 
be in issue in some cases where an inconsistent enactment is sought to be justified and 
she commends the approach taken by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Oakes.53  It 
appears that Her Honour is suggesting that s 5 is not essential in every case; for 
example, if a meaning consistent with s 6 is possible then recourse to s 5 for review of 
a legislative provision may not be required.  
3 Current approach to section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 
Despite the misgivings about the legal authority outlined above, the courts have 
taken a largely practical approach to reviewing legislation under the Bill of Rights Act. 
The judgments in Noort signal a cautious defining of the courts’ role, subsequent 
decisions trace a path towards more emphatic statements of the courts’ role: Simpson v 
Attorney-General (Baigent’s case),54 Quilter v Attorney-General55 Moonen v Film and 
                                                 
52 Ibid, at [179] per McGrath J; see also [16] per Elias CJ; [60] per Blanchard J; [157] per Tipping J. 
53 Ibid, at [42] per Elias CJ. 
54 Baigent’s case, above n 41.  
55 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA). See generally Mark Henaghan “Same-sex 
Marriages in the Court of Appeal” [1998] NZLJ 40; and Paul Rishworth “Reflections on the Bill of 
Rights Act after Quilter v Attorney-General” [1998] NZ Law Review 683. 
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Literature Board of Review (Moonen (No.1)),56 R v Poumako (Poumako)57 and R v 
Pora58.   
The Court of Appeal decision in Moonen (No.1) is noteworthy because the 
decision is a single judgment for the court, delivered by Tipping J, which attributes the 
courts with an active role under the Bill of Rights Act.  The Court of Appeal was asked 
to determine whether the Office of Film and Literature Classification (the decision-
makers under the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993) and the 
Film and Literature Board of Review (the Board) had taken proper account of the right 
to freedom of expression under s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act in their decision to deem 
specific material as objectionable.  In relation to the role of the courts under s 5, 
Tipping J states that: 59 
 
That purpose [of section 5] necessarily involves the Court having the power, 
and on occasions the duty, to indicate that although a statutory provision must 
be enforced according to its proper meaning, it is inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights, in that it constitutes an unreasonable limitation on the relevant right or 
freedom which cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.  
 
Tipping J also drew attention to the fact that courts would, necessarily, be 
required to make some value judgments in the course of analysis under s 5 of the Bill 
of Rights Act.60 This Court of Appeal decision also offered guidance for the 
application of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act including at what point in the analysis s 5 
should be considered: s 6 then s 5 then s 4.61  The analysis under s 5 was to include 
consideration of the objective that the offending provision sought to achieve and 
whether it is a proportionate response that interferes with the right as little as 
possible.62  The applicant appealed the Board’s reconsideration of the objectionable 
material and its application of the Bill of Rights Act (the appeal is referred to as 
“Moonen (No.2)”).63  Richardson P gave the judgment for the Court of Appeal in 
Moonen (No.2) dismissing the appeal and finding that the Board had applied the Bill of 
                                                 
56 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) [Moonen (No.1)]. 
57 R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA). 
58 R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37. 
59 Moonen (No.1), above n 56, at [20] per Tipping J. 
60 Moonen (No.1), above n 56, at [18] per Tipping J. 
61 Moonen (No.1), above n 56, at [17]-[19] per Tipping J. 
62 Moonen (No.1), above n 56, at [17]- [18] per Tipping J. 
63 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2002] 2 NZLR 754 (CA) [Moonen (No.2)]. 
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Rights Act correctly.  In addition, Richardson P reminded everyone that the five-step 
analytical approach outlined in Moonen (No.1) for applying the Bill of Rights Act was 
intended as guidance and that it was not intended to be prescriptive and that other 
approaches remain are open.64 
                                                
Likewise, the Court of Appeal in Poumako added more fuel to the discourse 
because it involved the review of a legislative provision that feel squarely into the 
domain of judicial experience (criminal proceedings) and was an emotive issue on 
which Parliament chose to respond emphatically. The Court of Appeal deliberated the 
question of whether a retrospective sentencing requirement s 2(4) of the Criminal 
Justice Amendment Act (No2) 1999 (amending s 80 of the principal Act) was 
inconsistent with s 25(g) of the Bill of Rights Act.  Section 25(g) requires that an 
accused has the benefit of the lesser penalty if convicted of an offence for which the 
penalty has been varied.   
The Court of Appeal in Poumako held unanimously that the provisions were 
inconsistent and that legislative revision was desirable but the majority did not issue a 
joint declaration of inconsistency.  Separate judgments were issued and they exhibited 
various mental gymnastics on the part of the Court of Appeal to reconcile rights with 
clear parliamentary intent that was contrary to the right.  This decision also overtly 
discusses the courts’ power to issue declarations of inconsistency with Thomas J 
(dissenting) issuing such a declaration.  Gault J (for Richardson P and Keith J also) 
states that the burden is on the Crown to prove a limit is justified under s 5 and notes 
that the Crown has not put forward any such arguments. Gault J comments that it is 
desirable for there to be legislative reconsideration of the offending provision and states 
that for declarations of inconsistency to be issues there needs to be arguments from 
both parties on the issue of justifications.65 Henry J endorses Gault J’s recommendation 
for legislative reconsideration but does not discuss the application of s 5 only noting the 
lack of reasons put forward for the enactment of the offending provision and the 
necessity of having argument from both sides before issuing a declaration of 
inconsistency. 66 
In contrast, Thomas J in Poumako discusses the role of s 4 of the Bill of Rights 
Act, the approach to s 5 in Moonen (No.1) and the role of the court – particularly in the 
context of issuing a declaration of inconsistency.  Thomas J expresses that the court has 
a supervisory role under the Bill of Rights Act and this includes determining: “in 
 
64 Ibid, at [14] per Richardson P. 
65 Poumako, above n 57, at [42] per Gault J. 
66 Ibid, at [67] per Henry J. 
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appropriate cases whether a legislative restriction represents a reasonable limitation, 
such as can be justified in a free and democratic society.”67 Thomas J does not, 
however, overtly apply s 5 in the course of the analysis before issuing such a 
declaration. 
In 2007, the majority in Hansen favoured analysis of legislation under s 5, 
expressly or by virtue of their analysis; with Elias CJ appearing to dissent on this point.  
This position is reasoned in several ways.  Anderson J attributes Parliament with a 
deliberate decision to permit such a review: 68 
 
It is indicative of the strength of our democratic institutions that Parliament, 
although not countenancing its being overruled has, by the terms of the Bill of 
Rights Act, accepted the prospect of judicial assessment of the consistency of 
its enactments with affirmed rights and freedoms. 
 
Tipping J views s 5 as an instruction to both Parliament and the courts, and 
describes the courts role as that of: “keeping Parliament faithful to the s 5 instruction, 
but with some inherent room for parliamentary appreciation.”69  Blanchard J’s 
statement of the courts role under s 5 follows a similar line, elaborating that the court 
must perform this role: “within the bounds of their jurisdiction and processes, an 
analysis of the legitimacy of challenged statutory provisions in their particular societal 
context.”70 
Therefore, despite the objections to review of legislation under s 5 of the Bill of 
Rights Act, the majority decision in Hansen presents clear legal authority for the courts 
to perform such review.  Furthermore, this review of legislation is constitutional review 
because of the constitutional values it seeks to promote and protect. 
C Review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act as constitutional review 
A law, policy, or practice is constitutional if it is “in harmony with, or 
authorized by, the political constitution” or “belonging to the very constitution or 
composition of anything; forming an essential part or element; essential.”71 A 
                                                 
67 Ibid, at [95] per Thomas J. 
68 Hansen, above n 8, at [266] per Anderson J. 
69 Hansen, above n 8, at [106] per Tipping J. 
70 Ibid, at [82] per Blanchard J. 
71 Oxford English Dictionary Online (10 July 2009). Note the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current 
English (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) that describes constitutional as “of, consistent with, authorised 
by, or limited by a political constitution.”  Compare, Palmer “What is New Zealand’s constitution”, 
above n 24, at 137: “A rule should be regarded as constitutional if it plays a significant role in 
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constitution also informs the way in which the branches of government work together 
and the fundamental standards they must meet in the exercise of their duties.72  
Constitutional review of legislation is prefaced on the idea that the standards against 
which the court reviews legislation are constitutional standards.  The Bill of Rights Act 
is part of the New Zealand constitution and the rights and freedoms affirmed in that Act 
are constitutional standards because they contain values that reflect the fundamental 
principles for equitable treatment of all people in New Zealand that act to guide the 
governance of New Zealand.73  
The courts act as an essential check on Parliament in a democracy, especially 
when it comes to the protection of human rights and in New Zealand they play a part in 
ensuring the transparency of parliamentary decision-making.  This recognises the fact 
that while members of Parliament are the elected representatives their role is more akin 
to a proxy than a representative.74  This transparency means that the public of New 
Zealand can make meaningful decisions about how to hold Parliament accountable for 
its actions and whether to lobby for change.  For example, public concern expressed 
about the Electoral Finance Act 2007 and the action sought by the courts in the 
Boscawen litigation75 is likely to have influenced the repeal of that Act by the Electoral 
Amendment Act 2009 when the government changed after the General Election 2008. 
The discussion by Justice Tipping in Hansen about the role of the courts under 
the Bill of Rights Act is illustrative of the courts’ constitutional role: 76 
 
Parliament has nevertheless given the New Zealand courts a significant review 
role.  That role arises by virtue of s 5, which requires that a limit on a right or 
freedom be demonstrably justified.  Determination of this question necessarily 
falls to the courts.  Parliament must therefore be taken to have disclaimed any 
kind of presumptive justification simply because it has enacted the limit.  The 
onus is on those who claim the limit is reasonable and justified to satisfy the 
court that this is demonstrably so. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
influencing the generic exercise of public power – whether through structures, processes, principles, 
rules, conventions or even culture.” 
72 See Palmer “What is New Zealand’s constitution”, above n 24, at 134. 
73 Joseph “Constitutional Review Now”, above n 3, at 90-93. 
74 See Kyritsis “Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review”, above n 30. 
75 Boscawen v Attorney-General [2008] NZAR 44 (HC); Boscawen v Attorney-General [2008] NZAR 
468 (HC); and Boscawen v Attorney-General [2009] 2 NZLR 229. 
76 Hansen, above n 8, at [108] per Tipping J. 
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In the New Zealand context this constitutional role of the courts under the Bill 
of Rights Act has been counterbalanced by a veto: s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act which 
provides that no court shall strike down or refuse to apply any provision that is 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights Act.  The constitutional status of 
the Bill of Rights Act is important because there are different interpretative principles 
the courts apply to constitutional instruments that, in turn, lend themselves to greater 
protection by the courts.  Two arguments are often made to diminish the constitutional 
status of the Bill of Rights Act: that the Bill of Rights Act is not entrenched and that it 
is not supreme law.  These arguments are canvassed below. 
1 Bill of Rights Act not entrenched 
The Bill of Rights Act is not entrenched.  This means that a simple majority in 
the House of Representatives can amend or repeal the Bill of Rights Act.  The lack of 
entrenchment of the Bill of Rights Act is often argued to diminish the constitutional 
status of the Bill of Rights Act and advocate for a narrow interpretation of a right in the 
Bill of Rights Act.77 The lack of entrenchment does not, however, undermine the 
ability for courts to give rights their fullest extent within the scheme of the Bill of 
Rights Act.   In Baigent’s Case, Gault J correctly distinguishes between the lack of 
entrenchment for the Bill of Rights Act and the courts role: 78 
                                                
 
The [Bill of Rights Act] states the law of New Zealand.  That it is not 
entrenched does not affect that.  Entrenchment and constitutional status go to 
the extent to which the legislature is bound by the particular law.  The result 
may be a restraint upon Parliament’s law-making powers but it makes no 
difference to the strength of the law where it is to be applied.  The Constitution 
Act 1986 also is not entrenched.  Accordingly, in the present case I do not see 
that whether or not it has constitutional status really assists.   
 
It is not the lack of entrenchment for the Bill of Rights Act that limits the 
courts’ role: it is the presence of s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act.  Gault J’s position on the 
constitutional status in this context is limited to the form and not the content of the Bill 
of Rights Act and reflects the fact that in Baigent’s case the focus is on the activities of 
State actors, not the empowering provision.  The development of the remedy of 
compensation by Gault J and his colleagues in Baigent’s case employs interpretation 
 
77 See, for example, the arguments of counsel in Baigent’s Case, above n 41. 
78 Baigent’s Case, above n 41, at 706 per Gault J. 
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and analytical practices reserved for constitutional statutes demonstrating the special 
nature of the values of the rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights Act and ensuring 
there is a tangible remedy where public office holders fail to act in accordance with the 
Bill of Rights Act. 
2 Bill of Rights Act not supreme law 
“Supreme law” is constitutional shorthand for situations when the courts have 
the ability to strike down legislation on the grounds that it is unconstitutional or 
inconsistent with a constitutional statute.  Kyritsis summarises this feature of 
constitutional review in the following terms: 79 
 
… constitutional review bestows on judges the power to strike down 
democratically reached decisions, that is, decisions made by a democratically 
elected legislature, which they find in contravention of the abstract moral 
principles enshrined in the constitution. 
 
The lack of supreme law status, however, is not fatal to the Bill of Rights Act’s 
constitutional status. This is because the constitutional relationship between the 
branches of government is complex and relies on each branch making their contribution 
based on their institutional advantages.  The institutional advantage of the courts is that 
they are independent and impartial when interpreting and applying the law – they do 
not bring political agendas to their decision-making and are not reliant on elections for 
their continuation in office.  Tipping J in Hansen, after stating that a major purpose of 
the Bill of Rights Act is to protect minority interests from an oppressive majority, 
observes that: 
 
The point is essentially the same whether the courts have power to strike down 
legislation or whether, as in New Zealand, they do not, and can only declare 
that certain legislation, although operative, is inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights. 80 
 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has expressed concern that the 
Bill of Rights Act is an ordinary statute and that it is possible to enact legislation 
                                                 
79 Kyritsis  “Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review”, above n 30. 
80 Hansen, above n 8, at [107] per Tipping J. 
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inconsistently with the Bill of Rights Act that deprives victims of a domestic remedy.81 
While supreme law status is salient in the international human rights context and is a 
policy option that the Executive and Parliament will hopefully include on its agenda for 
its review of New Zealand’s constitution arrangements;82 the lack of supreme law 
status is not determinative as to whether the Bill of Rights Act is part of the 
constitution.  
3 Preservation of legislative supremacy: section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act 
The courts have one crucial constitutional constraint placed on their exercise of 
constitutional review: they are not able to strike down legislation. Section 4 of the Bill 
of Rights Act explicitly retains the legislative supremacy of Parliament.  The express 
protection of legislative supremacy in the Bill of Rights Act contrasts starkly with that 
taken in Canadian Charter under which the courts have held legislative provisions to be 
void because they are not a justified limitation on a right (or saved by s 33 of the 
Canadian Charter).  Section 33 of the Canadian Charter clearly places: “the 
responsibility for trumping rights and freedoms on political shoulders.  
Parliamentarians can decide to trump the Charter … but they must do so explicitly and 
accept the public relations consequences of their actions.”83   
In the New Zealand context, as reflected in s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act and 
observed in academic writing: parliamentary sovereignty is still at the core of New 
Zealand’s constitution and a reflection of the New Zealand constitutional norm of a 
strong representative democracy.84  Matthew Palmer in “New Zealand Constitutional  
Culture” attributes this approach to a:85 
 
…[s]uspicion of judges’ ability to frustrate the will of a democratically elected 
government taps into a deep root in the New Zealand national constitutional 
culture.  The egalitarian and apparently democratic ethic remains strong in 
New Zealand. 
 
                                                 
81 United Nations Human Rights Committee Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under 
article 40 of the Covenant: concluding observation of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand, 7 
August 2002, CCPR/CO/75/NZL. See also Andrew Butler “Strengthening the Bill of Rights” (2000) 31 
VUWLR 129, at 136.  
82 Prime Minister John Key “Statement to Parliament” (Statement to Parliament, 9 February 2010. 
83 A Butler “The Bill of Rights Debate”, above n 16, at 342. 
84 See generally A Butler “The Bill of Rights Debate”, above n 16, at 340; Joseph Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, above n 3, at ch14; and John Burrows and Ross Carter Statute Law in New Zealand 
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at ch 2; and Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional Culture”, above n 25. 
85 Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional Culture”, above n 25, at 586. 
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The Justice and Law Reform Committee also observe this attitude in 
considering submissions on the White Paper, and judges and other academics have 
made similar observations.86   
D Constitutional character of the Bill of Rights Act in practice 
The judgments of the courts are also a source of constitutional law and a further 
example of the Bill of Rights Act being given constitutional status is reflected in how it 
is interpreted and applied by the courts and then, in turn, by the other branches of 
government. Ordinarily, if there are contradictory provisions the more recent legislation 
overrides the earlier legislation.  This principle is called the doctrine of implied repeal 
and it is a principle of statutory interpretation.87 The courts apply this doctrine in 
recognition of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty: the belief that an earlier 
Parliament cannot bind its successors and that the most recent articulation of a law is 
the authoritative version.  The doctrine of implied repeal, if applied to the Bill of Rights 
Act, would undermine the purpose of the Act “to affirm, protect, and promote human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand”88 because it would only apply to 
legislation enacted before the Bill of Rights Act.  The courts have developed and 
employed the principle of legality to reconcile the tension between the doctrine of 
implied repeal and constitutional statutes:89 
 
At common law, two developments have strengthened the normative force of 
civil and political rights: the principle of legality (Parliament must “speak 
clearly” if it wishes to abrogate rights) and the protection of statutory rights 
from implied repeal (ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed, 
constitutional and human rights statutes may not). 
 
The rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights Act are principles that apply to 
legislative provisions regardless of when they were enacted: the courts have recognised 
                                                 
86 Justice and Law Reform Committee Interim Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee, Inquiry 
into the White Paper – A Bill of Rights for New Zealand [1986-1987] X AJHR I.8A at 8-23 [Interim 
Report]; and Justice and Law Reform Committee Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee 
on a White Paper – A Bill of Rights for New Zealand [1987-1990] AJHR I.8C at 3 [Final Report].  See 
also Hansen, above n 8, at [187]-[189] per McGrath J; A Butler “The Bill of Rights Debate”, above n 16, 
at 324; Burrows and Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 84, at 30-31. 
87 See generally Burrows and Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 84, at ch 8 and ch 11 
88 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title. 
89 Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law, above n 3, at 7.  See also Palmer “What is New 
Zealand’s constitution”, above n 24, at 139.  This approach has been affirmed in the United Kingdom, 
see Thoburn v Sutherland City Council [2002] 4 All ER 156. 
 
32 
the primacy of the Bill of Rights Act by: “displacing the doctrine of implied repeal”.90  
The application of the principle of legality is judicial recognition of the constitutional 
status of the Bill of Rights Act. 
The courts are not alone in according the Bill of Rights Act constitutional 
status; this constitutional status is also accepted by academics and observed by the 
Executive and Parliament.  This is relevant because, as noted by Rishworth and the 
Constitutional Arrangements Committee, constitutional significance: “arises from an 
amalgam of considerations, including the importance of the enactment to transcending 
constitutional questions, the consensus of commentators, and public opinion”.91 While 
in 1992, Brookfield observes that the Bill of Rights may “yet acquire the quasi-
constitutional status that its long title would lead one to expect for it”92 we later see the 
Bill of Rights Act has acquired this status in academic literature.93  For example, both 
Joseph and Palmer identify the Bill of Rights Act as a constitutional statute.94   Joseph 
designates the Bill of Rights Act as a constitutional statute describing it as a reform that 
has “capitalised upon earlier institutional innovations to establish and indigenous 
constitutional system.”95  In concert with this position, Palmer’s article outlining New 
Zealand’s constitutional instruments states that: 96 
 
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) is an example of a statute that is so self-
consciously constitutional that, while s 4 makes clear that other legislation 
cannot be struck down by its application, s 6 calls for courts to interpret all 
other statutes consistently with its rights and freedoms, where possible.  This 
reflects the long-held common law disposition to interpret legislation 
consistently with fundamental principles of law. 
 
                                                 
90 Claudia Geiringer, “The Dead Hand of the Bill of Rights? Is the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
a Substantive Legal Constraint on Parliament’s Power to Legislate?” (2007) 11(3) Otago Law Review 
389. 
91 Constitutional Arrangements Committee Inquiry to review New Zealand’s existing constitutional 
arrangements, above n 1, at 30 quoting Paul Rishworth (ed) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 2002) at [2] footnote 11: “’Constitutional significance’ is not bestowed by 
Parliament or anyone else.  It arises from an amalgam of considerations, including the importance of the 
enactment to transcending constitutional questions, the consensus of commentators, and public opinion.  
This is why an enactment might evolve into the ‘constitutional’ category, as the Treaty of Waitangi did 
in the 1980s”. 
92 Brookfield “Constitutional Law”, above n 32, at 237. 
93 See generally Rishworth, The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 91, ch 1; and Butler and Butler The 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary, above n 43, at ch 1, 2, and 3. 
94 Palmer “What is New Zealand’s constitution”, above n 24, at 139, 142-144 and annex. 
95 Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law, above n 3, at 4. 
96 Palmer “What is New Zealand’s constitution”, above n 24, at 139. 
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The Executive branch also ascribes the Bill of Rights Act with constitutional 
status.97  For example, the introduction to the Cabinet Manual prepared by the Rt Hon 
Sir Kenneth Keith includes the Bill of Rights Act as one of the sources of the 
constitution and the Cabinet guidelines set out specific processes departments must 
follow to ensure they develop policy consistently with the Bill of Rights Act.98  The 
report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee records the Bill of Rights Act as 
one of New Zealand’s constitutional milestones, and notes that the Bill of Rights Act is 
one of the written parts of New Zealand’s constitution.99 
Finally, one of the clearest indicators of the courts’ ability to perform 
constitutional review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act is accepted by 
Parliament is the lack of legislative curtailment of this activity.  Parliament has proved 
that it can be extraordinarily reactive in the wake of unwelcome judicial decisions as 
exemplified by the passing of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 that responded to the 
decision in Ngati Apa v Attorney-General.100  However, the Bill of Rights Act has 
remained manifestly unblemished by legislative amendment.  Section 19 of the Bill of 
Rights Act is the only section to be amended when it was substituted to refer to the 
prohibited grounds in the Human Rights Act 1993 rather than the grounds of “ground 
of colour, race, ethnic or national origins, sex, marital status, or religious or ethical 
belief” in subs (1), and refer to the Human Rights Act in subs (2).101  After the decision 
in Baigent’s case, the Executive referred the matter to the Law Commission for 
consideration and the Commission concluded: “that there should be no general 
legislation removing or circumscribing the remedy for breach of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, which Baigent’s case held to be available.”102 
Furthermore, Executive and Legislature action shows consideration of the same 
approach taken by the courts.  For example, reports tabled in the House of 
Representatives by the Attorney-General under s 7 of the Bill of Rights Act not only 
apply s 5 but also do so with reference to the courts’ decisions in cases such as Moonen 
                                                 
97 See generally Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at 1-6; Ministry of Justice The Guidelines On The 
New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990: A Guide To The Rights And Freedoms In The Bill Of Rights Act 
For The Public Sector (Wellington, 2004) at Part I; Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on 
Process and Content of Legislation (Wellington NZ, 2001 edition with amendments to full text) at ch 4; 
and New Zealand Government New Zealand National Universal Periodic Review Report to the Human 
Rights Council A/HRC/WG.6/5/NZL/1 (9 April 2009). 
98 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008, above n 96, at 1-6; and CabGuide 
<http://cabguide.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/> 
99 Constitutional Arrangements Committee Inquiry to review New Zealand’s existing constitutional 
arrangements, above n 1, at 35 and 84. 
100 Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (Māori Land Court). 
101 This amendment took effect on1 February 1994 pursuant to s 145 Human Rights Act 1993. 
102 Law Commission Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity A response to Baigent’s case and Harvey v 
Derrick (NZLC R37, 1997) at 7 [Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity]. 
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(No.1) and Hansen.103 The lack of legislative amendment also reflects the reverence, 
whether ideological or out of political necessity, with which the Bill of Rights Act is 
regarded by the Executive and Legislature.  In fact, we have seen attempts, through a 
Member’s Bills, to see rights added to the Bill of Rights Act in an effort to gain greater 
legal and constitutional status to better serve those interests.104 
To conclude, the three branches of government consider the Bill of Rights Act 
to be part of the New Zealand constitution.  From a pragmatic perspective, not only can 
the courts perform review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act and this type of 
review can be characterised as constitutional review because it seeks to ensure that 
legislation is consistent with constitutional values.  This is an evolving role in which 
the courts have struck a cautious balance to date to ensure that their analysis is 
consistent with the constitution to maintain the legitimacy of constitutional review of 
legislation.   
 
                                                 
103 See Attorney-General Report of the, under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Liquor 
Advertising (Television and Radio) Bill, presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to section 7 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (2 July 2009) J.4; and Attorney-General, Report of the, under 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Eden Park Trust Amendment Bill, presented to the House 
of Representatives pursuant to section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (8 April 2009) J.4. 
104 See Human Rights (Gender Identity) Amendment Bill (Georgina Beyer MP) and the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act (Property Rights) Amendment Bill (Gordon Copeland MP). 
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III PERFORMANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
 
The challenge to the legitimacy of constitutional review is not limited to 
challenging the legal authority for that review.105 A prominent objection to 
constitutional review of legislation is that it is undemocratic because judges are 
reviewing and, in some jurisdictions, able to strike down legislation; this activity is 
seen as contrary to the purpose of a democracy that is intended to see the law and 
governance of a country reflect the views and beliefs of the public as determined by a 
representative Parliament.  This is often referred to as the “democratic” or “anti-
majoritarian” objection to constitutional review.  This objection is present in the 
literature even in countries that limit legislative power under their constitution and 
permit judges to strike down law.106   
The democratic objection, however, takes an overly simplistic view of 
democracy and fails to account for the fact that there is democratic value in people 
being able to use the institutional advantages of impartial decision-making available 
through the courts to challenge the law and promote change.  Constitutional review is a 
way of generating debate about the effect of policy or laws on the broader public 
interests or challenging the application of laws that may have a disproportionate effect 
on minorities or marginalised groups in society.  The democratic objection is not born 
out in the New Zealand context in light of the approach the courts take to constitutional 
review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act.  This chapter uses the judgments in 
Hansen to illustrate that the method employed by the courts to perform constitutional 
review ameliorates the democratic objection to constitutional review.  
Constitutional review requires the courts to assess the substance of the law 
against constitutional standards such as the rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights 
Act.  This form of review, as observed by Joseph, is distinct from administrative law 
review because administrative law review is a “review of process and the logic of 
decision-making”.107   
                                                 
105 See Kyritsis “Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review”, above n 30, at 733. 
106 Ekins “The Authority of Parliament”, above n 17, at 66. 
107 Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law, above n 3, at 21.11. 
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Joseph characterises the five analytical steps of constitutional review as being 
an inquiry by the courts of:108 
 
1. the value or importance of the public purpose the decision-maker 
seeks to achieve 
2. the nature of the interests involved (whether Treaty principles, our 
international treaty obligation, or our civil and political rights are in 
issue) 
3. the damaging or attenuating effect of the decision on those interests 
4. whether the desired public purpose(s) (the ends) could be achieved in 
less intrusive ways (the means) 
5. where the balance of public interest or welfare lies. 
 
These five elements of Joseph’s test for constitutional review are constituent 
elements of the two-stage approach employed for reviewing legislation for consistency 
with the Bill of Rights Act.  In general, there is a two-stage approach applied to 
assessing legislative provisions for inconsistency with most of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights Act.109  The first stage is to determine whether the legislative provision is 
inconsistent with a right and, therefore, poses a limit on the right concerned. The 
second and third elements of Joseph’s test, about the nature of the interests and the 
effect of the legislative provision on those interests, are used to determine whether the 
legislative provision is a limit on the right.  Whether a legislative provision poses a 
limit on the right involves interpretation of the right, the purpose of the legislative 
provision concerned, and the effect of that legislative provision on the right. The 
second stage is to assess whether the limit posed by the legislative provision is justified 
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.110 The first, fourth and fifth elements of Joseph’s 
test are constituent elements of the proportionality analysis that is generally employed 
to determine whether that limit is a justified limitation on the right under s 5 of the Bill 
of Rights Act.   
New Zealand is not alone is applying a two-step test that is then broken down 
into elements both Canada and the United Kingdom take a similar approach; for 
                                                 
108 Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law, above n 3, at 21.11.1.  In the 1998 article, there was an 
additional element at four: whether the decision-maker has diligently taken into account those matters. 
109 There is some debate in both about whether s 5 analysis should be applied to some of the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights Act such as s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act which includes the concept of 
“reasonableness” as part of the right. 
110 See Noort, above n 27, 283 Richardson J. 
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example, Jowell summarises the courts’ inquiry under constitutional litigation as two 
questions:111 
 
First, is there a breach of a fundamental democratic right?  If the answer to that 
question is in the affirmative, the second question asks whether the decision, 
which appears on its face to subvert democracy, is in fact necessary to preserve 
it in the interest of a legitimate countervailing democratic value.  In addressing 
these questions the courts will look to the process of justification of the 
decision and to the inherent qualities of a democratic society. 
 
  This following discussion examines how the courts apply the test and its 
elements in context of Hansen to assess whether the performance of constitutional 
review of legislation is consistent with the constitution.  
A Purposive approach to interpretation and the Bill of Rights Act 
The manner in which courts interpret the right and the legislative provision 
concerned in performing constitutional review of legislation is not only consistent with 
New Zealand’s constitution but it also refutes critiques of constitutional review.  
Constitutional review under the Bill of Rights Act has not seen the advent of new and 
radical interpretative tools that endanger parliamentary sovereignty.  When performing 
constitutional review judges have, however, adopted and used interpretation practices 
that have developed and strengthened over the last 100 years.  
The courts’ role has traditionally been described as that of interpretation and 
application of the law.  In order to perform this role, the courts have assembled, using 
common law, a range of interpretation practices, principles and rules.  In New Zealand 
many of these rules are reflected in the Interpretation Act 1999 (and its predecessor: 
Acts Interpretation Act 1924).  In addition to applying the principle of legality (rather 
than the doctrine of implied repeal) to give effect to the right, the courts employ the 
purposive approach drawing on legislative history of a provision and the Act concerned 
to aid the interpretation of the right and the legislative provision concerned. 
The purposive approach has legislative authority in New Zealand by virtue of s 
5(1) of the Interpretation Act 1999 which states: “[t]he meaning of an enactment must 
                                                 
111 Jeffrey Jowell “Beyond the rule of law: towards constitutional judicial review” [2000] Public Law 67 
at 682 [“Beyond the rule of law”].   For Canadian approach, see generally Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. 
Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or perhaps the Charter of Rights isn’t 
such a bad thing after all)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75, at 93-94 [“The Charter Dialogue”]; and Peter 
W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton and Wade K Wright “Charter Dialogue Revisited--Or "Much 
Ado About Metaphors" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 3 [“Charter Dialogue Revisited"]. 
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be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose.”  This section replaced its 
lengthier predecessor s 5(j) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924.  However, this 
interpretative approach has its genesis in the mists of English common law.  In Statute 
Law in New Zealand, Burrows and Carter attribute this approach to Heydon’s Case112 
which was decided in 1584 by the Barons of Exchequer who developed the rule that 
saw interpretation being informed by the “mischief or defect” that the Act sought to 
remedy.113 The modern articulation of the purposive approach is attributed to Lord 
Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher.114 The courts rely on an array of 
interpretation aids for identifying the purpose of a provision including the Long Title 
and Preamble of the Act, the reports of the select committee, and the debates in the 
House of Representatives. Despite the frequent use of legislative history as part of the 
purposive approach, examination of “intention” is treated with great caution when 
interpreting statutes.  For example, Elias CJ cautions against considering legislative 
intention in determining the meaning of a legislative provision:115 
 
The Law Commission recommended against reference to such “intention”. The 
Interpretation Act as enacted follows instead the Law Commission’s emphasis 
on meaning, context and purpose.  The principle in s 6 of the Interpretation Act 
that an enactment must apply to circumstances as they arise underscores the 
self-evident point that statutes must apply in conditions which may not have 
been foreseen at the time of enactment.  The “very strong and far reaching” 
obligation of interpretation under s 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
may also require a meaning to be given to a provision which was not 
envisaged at the time of its enactment. 
 
Claims that applying the purposive approach undermines the constitution and 
parliamentary sovereignty are suspect when considered in light of Parliament’s 
endorsement of this approach by enacting it in the Interpretation Act 1999.  
Furthermore, the purposive approach is intended to give better effect to Parliament’s 
intention when interpreting legislation because it: “is more in line with democratic 
theory: the courts’ avowed task is to cooperate with, rather than frustrate, the will of 
Parliament.”116  
                                                 
112 Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a (EWHC Exch). 
113 Burrows and Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 84, at 203-204. 
114 Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319. 
115 Hansen, above n 8, at [14] per Elias CJ. 
116 Burrows and Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 84, at 218. 
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1 The purposive approach to interpreting rights  
A fulsome understanding of the right forms the essential benchmark against 
which the importance of the limit is balanced in the proportionality assessment, and 
such an understanding of the right should be articulated not assumed.117  Articulating 
the nature of the right appears to be entirely consistent with the role of judges to 
interpret the law; particularly as many of these rights have their genesis in the common 
law.  The purposive approach is essential to the proper interpretation of rights under the 
Bill of Rights Act.  Burrows and Carter frame this approach in pragmatic terms 
because: “a purely literal construction is scarcely possible given the general nature of 
its wording.”118 Similarly Rishworth observes that Bills of Rights call for a different 
approach to interpretation from different statutes because they “use broad and general 
phrases to denote fundamental moral and political principles, and judges (along with 
other interpreters) are to give them specification in particular settings.”119   
For these reasons, the purposive approach has been adopted in New Zealand by 
the courts for interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights Act.  The purposive approach 
was endorsed with approval by the Court of Appeal in Noort: 120 
 
The fundamental rights affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act are to be given full 
effect and are not to be narrowly construed.  Its provisions are to be construed 
to ensure its objects of protecting and promoting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.  It is a statute, not an entrenched constitutional 
document, but it is couched in broad terms requiring interpretation appropriate 
to those objects.  
 
While Justice Gault’s conclusion dissented from that of the majority in Noort, 
this interpretative statement is applied throughout the majority judgments in Noort and 
subsequent judgments under the Bill of Rights Act121 reinforcing the need for the 
purposive interpretation of right to include consideration of the “overarching aim” of 
that right.122  New Zealand is not alone in taking the purposive approach to interpreting 
human rights; it can be seen, for example, in decisions under the Canadian Charter such 
                                                 
117 Compare, Burrows and Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 84, at 224. 
118 Ibid, at 336. 
119 Rishworth, The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 91, 43. 
120 Noort, above n 27, at 292 per Gault J (dissenting). 
121 See Richardson P’s judgments in R v Jefferies [1994] 1 NZLR 290 (CA) at 299 and R v Te Kira 
[1993] 3 NZLR 256 (CA) at 271. 
122 See also Rishworth, The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 91, at 45. 
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as: R v Oakes (Oakes),123 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd,124 and R v Chaulk (Chaulk).125 
These decisions under the Canadian Charter are regularly cited in both judgments and 
academic literature in New Zealand to reinforce the legitimacy of that application of the 
purposive approach to human rights.126   
The purposive approach contrasts with that of the originalist approach. The 
originalist school of thought in the United States advocates that the United States 
Constitution should be interpreted consistently with the framers original intention.  
Rishworth observes that this approach has not generated much debate in New Zealand 
possibly due to the youthful nature of the Bill of Rights Act and a shift in thinking to 
rights being concepts and that “the guiding principle is the ‘purpose of the right’, rather 
than the Parliament’s purpose in enacting it.”127  
Therefore, while the purposive approach does look, in part, to the historical 
context in which legislation was passed, the primary focus is what it was trying to 
achieve long term.  An example of this approach is evident in the High Court decision 
in Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission, a case involving 
discrimination against a group not traditionally discriminated against, in which 
Cartwright J observes:128 
 
Understanding of the purpose of legislation designed to promote and protect 
human rights has evolved since 1989 and the focus cannot, if it ever was in 
New Zealand, primarily be on remedying adverse outcomes for traditionally 
disadvantaged groups.  
 
The purposive approach is vital in ensuring that the rights in the Bill of Rights Act 
remain enduring constitutional values.  Burrows and Carter identify four matters as 
relevant in interpreting rights in the Bill of Rights Act: the scheme of the Bill of Rights 
Act, parliamentary history, history of the rights themselves, and the international 
dimension of the right.129 Ascertaining and using the purpose of the right goes to the 
heart of the purposive approach and is also pivotal when examining the effect a limit 
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has on the right.  The decisions of Elias CJ and McGrath J in Hansen reflect this 
approach. 
There is limited discussion in Hansen about how to determine the meaning of a 
right; although the method taken suggests ready acceptance of the purposive approach.  
Elias CJ and McGrath J demonstrate the method with a dedicated discussion in each of 
their judgments about the right to be presumed innocent as protected by s 25(c) of the 
Bill of Rights Act.  In contrast, the discussion in the judgments of Blanchard, Tipping, 
and Anderson JJ is minimal and usually inferred from their comments about other 
matters. 
In addition to applying the purposive approach, Elias CJ dedicates several 
paragraphs to describing the analytical approach to defining rights.  The meaning of the 
right is to be “ascertained by reference to the register provided by the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act, viewed in context (including the context provided by the International 
Covenant).”130  Furthermore, Elias CJ endorses a purposive approach to the right 
quoting with approval Dickson CJ in Oakes who identified the following 
considerations as relevant to the interpretation of rights: 131 
• the character and objectives of the bill of rights itself 
• the language chosen 
• the historical origins of the concepts underpinning the right 
• and, where applicable, the meaning and purpose of related rights and 
freedoms. 
 
While McGrath J’s judgment carefully examines the right to be presumed 
innocent, it does not provide a discussion about how the meaning of the right should be 
determined.  McGrath J’s approach largely reflects that described by Elias CJ and in 
concluding his discussion of the right, Justice McGrath notes that the “importance of 
the right to the benefit of the presumption of innocence” as an essential element in 
considering whether a statutory provision is a justified limitation.132 
The rights in the Bill of Rights Act have common law and international law 
heritage and “many in fact have a far longer history than that: many can be traced back 
to the social philosophy of centuries past.”133 Often the historical and international 
genesis of a right is expressed together.  In her judgment, Elias CJ in Hansen notes the 
                                                 
130 Hansen, above n 8, at [18] per Elias CJ. 
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common law origin of the right to be presumed innocent as articulated in Woolmington 
v Director of Public Prosecutions134 and Viscount Sankey LC’s observation in 
Woolmington that the rule can be modified by statute.135  Elias CJ then identifies that 
this common law rule has been recognised as a human right in international instruments 
such as article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 14(2) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) before appearing in s 
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act and concludes that the Bill of Rights Act enacted it a 
minimum standard of criminal procedure in 1990.136  Likewise, McGrath J discusses 
the presumption of innocence including its origins in common law, its occupation in the 
ICCPR and European Convention on Human Rights, and its role as a “core value in the 
criminal justice system.”137   
In examining the purpose of the right to be presumed innocent, Elias CJ also 
describes the right to be presumed innocent as a protection against error in criminal 
process and considers it to be an aspect of fair trial.  The Chief Justice draws on the 
borderless dimension of human rights when defining the nature of the right by quoting 
the following passage from Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court to 
support the proposition that the right is a protection against error:138 
 
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact 
finding, which both parties must take into account.  Where one party has at 
stake an interest of transcending value – as a criminal defendant his liberty – 
this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other 
party the burden ... of persuading the fact finder at the conclusion of the trial of 
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Like Elias CJ, McGrath J identifies the role of the presumption of innocence in 
criminal procedure as to: “reduce the risk of factual error in a criminal trial resulting in 
a wrongful conviction.”139  McGrath J also notes Wigmore’s statement about the effect 
this presumption has on a jury’s deliberations; it is intended to get them to focus on the 
evidence and not ascribe significance to the fact that the accused is being prosecuted.140 
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In Hansen, Elias CJ and McGrath J also go beyond the subjective (immediate) 
purpose of the right reducing the risk of wrongful conviction to the objective (long 
term) enduring purpose of promoting public confidence in the criminal justice system, 
namely that the public can be: “confident that innocent people are not convicted, 
because guilt of criminal charges is determined by independent courts which apply the 
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”141  In addition, McGrath J sees the 
presumption of innocence as a form of constitutional protection that is recognised by 
the community as a: “protection of the citizen which balances the interests of persons 
charged against the power and resources of the State as the prosecutor of charges of 
criminal offending”.142 Similarly, Elias CJ quotes from Sachs J’s judgment in the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in S v Coetzee to draw attention to the importance 
the right to be presumed innocent from a broader perspective; it “serves not only to 
protect a particular individual on trial, but to maintain public confidence in the 
enduring integrity and security of the legal system.”143  It is vital that both the 
subjective and objective approach to defining the nature of the right is considered 
because it is material when balancing the right and the limit as part of the 
proportionality test under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
As demonstrated above, the use of the purposive approach to articulate the 
meaning of a right can be performed in a way that does not circumscribe Parliament’s 
legislative supremacy. Articulating the genesis of a right not only stamps it with the 
“enduring” label; it provides an insight into its original necessity and its place in 
society today – a reminder of the democratic values the right is intended to protect.  
Burrows and Carter provide an apt caution that such an assessment should not freeze 
the right in the past because: “the Bill [of Rights Act] must do service in the changing 
circumstances of the future.”144 The long title acknowledges that one of the purposes of 
the Bill of Rights Act was to affirm rights suggesting that Parliament intended to import 
the history of a right into the Bill of Rights Act and, as noted by Burrows and Carter: 
“the rights are not conferred by the Act itself, but rather derive from fundamental 
respect for the human person”.145  Examining the purpose of the right gives better 
effect to Parliament’s goal in enacting the Bill of Rights Act rather than undermining 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
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2 Purposive approach to interpreting the legislative provision on the right 
The courts often apply a more restrictive approach to interpreting a legislative 
provision if: “the legislation is perceived as threatening certain values which are 
fundamental to our legal system.”146 While the meaning of the limit may itself be 
construed narrowly, the courts do seek to appreciate why Parliament has opted to enact 
a limit by articulating its public purpose using the purposive approach.   
In Hansen the purpose of the Misuse of Drugs Act was used to provide an 
insight about the end that the provision was seeking to achieve to complement the 
assessment of the intended effect of the provision.147  Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath, 
and Anderson JJ all locate the public purpose of the reverse onus in s 6(6) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act within the broader social issue of illegal drug use and prosecuting 
offenders. While Tipping J and McGrath J deal with the public purpose quickly 
concluding that it is important; Blanchard and Anderson JJ provide a more detailed 
account. 
Despite the brevity of the descriptions by Tipping and McGrath JJ both the 
purpose of the Act and the provision are canvassed.  For example, McGrath J describes 
the public purpose as twofold:148 
 
First it is to reduce the volume of controlled drugs that come onto the illegal 
market. Secondly it is to facilitate detection and prosecution of commercial 
drug dealing behaviour. 
 
McGrath J also notes the context in which the provision sits by connecting it to 
the objective of repressing illicit dealing in controlled drugs.149   
The separate judgments of Anderson and Blanchard JJ go into greater detail 
about the purpose of the Act and the context in which the provision operates by noting 
the social problem posed by drug use and describing the prosecutorial problems with 
proving possession for the purposes of drug trafficking as opposed to possession for 
personal use. For example, in discussing the social problem posed by drugs, Blanchard 
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J provides a high level description reflecting on the purpose of the Misuse of Drugs 
Act:150 
 
No-one familiar with life in New Zealand would dispute that the misuse of 
drugs to which the 1975 Act is directed is a cause of grave social ills and that 
the trafficking of controlled drugs is an evil.  They can cause death and misery 
for users, who are frequently stimulated to criminal activity under their mind-
altering and addictive effects.   
 
Furthermore, both Blanchard and Anderson JJ consider this problem and the 
“health, safety and economic implications” to be obvious and not requiring great 
elaboration.151  While this seems contrary to the principle that courts should discover 
rather than assume a purpose; it is worth bearing in mind that the courts are the primary 
stage in which criminal justice plays out.  Blanchard J then describes the problem the 
provision is intended to resolve as the challenge faced by prosecutors in establishing 
that drugs were held for dealing, which carries a higher penalty, as opposed to personal 
use.  Specifically, Blanchard J notes that it is easier for the prosecutor to prove when 
the offending is at the extreme ends of the scale, but in the case of equivocal amounts, 
such as those amounts held by street dealers, it is more difficult to prove that the 
accused was trafficking the drugs.152  Anderson J, unlike Blanchard J, reaches the 
conclusion after this analysis that: “I see no justification for the proposition which 
seems to underpin s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act, namely that because it is difficult 
for the prosecution to prove an element of a crime it does not have to.  That is an 
unprincipled expedient.” 153 
Chief Justice Elias’ judgment in Hansen does not specifically discuss the public 
purpose of the provision or the Act beyond briefly noting that the public interest in 
repressing drug taking is reflected in statutory provisions and commitment of police 
resources.154  
As for interpreting the purpose and meaning of the right, the use of the 
purposive approach to gain an understanding of the purpose of the legislative provision 
concerned ensures that a balanced consideration of a limit in the proportionality test.  
This approach to interpretation for the legislative provision can be performed 
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consistently with the constitution and without undermining Parliament’s legislative 
supremacy.  The controversy, arguably, arises not in the interpretation of the limit but 
when the courts consider whether the objective behind that limit is of value or 
importance because this assessment involves a value judgment or when the courts seek 
to interpret the legislative provision consistently with the Bill of Rights Act under s 6 
of that Act. 
3 Assessing the effect of the legislative provision on the right 
An assessment of the effect of a legislative provision on the right, under Bill of 
Rights Act analysis, is usually made in either or both of the following contexts: when 
determining whether the provision places a limit on the right, or as part of the 
proportionality test.155  While assessing the effect of the provision on the right does not 
necessitate a purposive approach, there can be differing outcomes to this assessment if 
the purposive interpretation of the right and the legislative provision is performed too 
broadly or too narrowly which may have the effect of undermining the law. 
While there is limited discussion in Hansen, about how the courts should 
analyse the effect of a provision on the right, each judgment does assess the effect of s 
6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.  Blanchard J’s judgment provides some insight into 
how the courts should approach this assessment:156 
 
In a case such as this, when the natural meaning of a legislative provision and 
the obvious Parliamentary intention coincide, the starting point for the 
application of the Bill of Rights must be to examine that meaning against the 
relevant guaranteed right – in this case, s 25(c) – to see if it apparently curtails 
the right so as to engage the Bill of Rights’ interpretive provisions (ss 4, 5 and 
6). 
 
The meaning and purpose associated with the right plays a pivotal role in this 
analysis; if the right is construed narrowly with only reference to the subjective effects 
of the legislative provision concerned in the immediate situation then the damaging or 
attenuating effect of the provision may be marginalised.  In contrast if the right is also 
defined in terms of the objective purposes then the broader or “distant” effects of the 
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limit on the right can also be measured.157  The judgments in Hansen characterise the 
damaging effect of s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act on the right as the risk for 
wrongful conviction and the undermining of the right itself.  Both of these effects on 
the right have subjective and objective elements.  
Elias CJ, McGrath and Anderson JJ consider the subjective effect of wrongful 
conviction on an individual as part of their analysis. McGrath J quotes the following 
from Dickson CJ in Oakes to illustrate the serious consequences of criminal 
conviction:158 
 
The presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty and human 
dignity of any and every person accused by the State of criminal conduct. An 
individual charged with a criminal offence faces grave social and personal 
consequences, including potential loss of physical liberty, subjection to social 
stigma and ostracism from the community, as well as other social, 
psychological and economic harms.  
 
Elias CJ considers that the damaging effect of s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
is that it permits conviction of those who cannot disprove the presumption and: “who 
are as likely as not to have no intention of supplying others, but who cannot overcome 
the persuasive burden”.159  Anderson J in the context of discussing the House of Lords 
decision in R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex p Kebilene,160 states his conclusion 
in respect of a presumption defence bluntly as meaning: “an accused could be 
convicted on the strength of suspicion”.161 
In contrast, the judgments of Blanchard and Tipping JJ focus on the nature of 
the risk of wrongful conviction and weigh that risk up against other factors.  The 
analysis of risk is subjective because it focuses on the outcomes for an individual.  
Initially, Blanchard J looks at how the right is affected in practice and concludes that 
the risk is more theoretical than real:162 
 
I regard that risk [of wrongful conviction] as one which in the vast majority of 
cases will be more theoretical than real.  It is also a risk that can easily be 
avoided by those whose (unlawful) possession of drugs is genuinely for their 
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own use by refraining from acquisition of such quantities as may attract the 
reverse onus. 
 
This assessment by Blanchard J focuses on the risk of wrongful conviction for 
the individual concerned and does not look to the broader effect of the limit on the right 
itself. 163  In the context of looking at how the levels for the presumption are set, 
Tipping J expresses concern that the fact that the level reflects only the probability of 
supply increases the risk of wrongful conviction.164 
Both Tipping and Blanchard JJ make these observations about the risk of 
wrongful conviction when weighing up whether or not the limit imposed by s 6(6) of 
the Misuse of Drugs Act is proportionate to the objective to determine if it is a justified 
limitation under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  Yet, both judges reach a different 
conclusion with Blanchard J concluding that the provision is justified while Tipping J 
concludes that it not.  The material difference may be that while Tipping J characterises 
the effect of s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act on the right to be presumed innocent in 
terms of the risk of wrongful conviction he also introduces an objective element and 
reaches a different conclusion from Blanchard J by drawing on the historical values 
attributed to the right:165 
 
From the days of Blackstone that risk has generally been regarded as more 
acceptable than that of convicting the innocent.  To what extent either of these 
risks are or would actually be manifested is impossible to establish with any 
numerical precision.  The advantage on one side does not necessarily 
approximate the disadvantage on the other.  The number of guilty persons who 
would not be convicted if the presumption were weaker bears no necessary 
relationship to the number of innocent persons who would not be convicted for 
the same reason. 
 
The assessment of the objective effect of the limit often leads the analysis back 
to the value of the right itself in the course of the proportionality test.  For example, 
McGrath J concludes, after ascertaining the ordinary meaning of s 6(6) of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act and discussing the nature of the right,166 that it is inconsistent with s 25(c) of 
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the Bill of Rights Act without reference to the damaging or attenuating effect that s 
6(6) may have on the right.167  Later in the judgment McGrath J, like Blanchard and 
Tipping JJ, addresses the effect of s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act on the right to be 
presumed innocent when considering whether the limit is a proportionate one and 
focuses on the overall effect on the right:168 
 
Indeed it nullifies that right in relation to the mental element of the offence.  
The offence concerned is a very serious one, being punishable by a maximum 
term of eight years’ imprisonment.  The high degree of social importance of 
the protected right, which is not in dispute, is engaged.  
 
This quote demonstrates that McGrath J progresses from the subjective effect of 
the limit on the right (nullifying the mental element) to the objective effect on the right 
itself (social importance of the right is engaged) in the course of his analysis. 
Anderson J, after making general statements about how the court should apply 
the Bill of Rights Act, describes the effect of s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act in 
objective terms as replacing the presumption of innocence with a “presumption of 
guilt” pointing to potential erosion of the right given drug trafficking is not the only 
type of criminal offending in which the prosecution may have problems proving intent 
or the requisite mental element.169 Anderson J concludes that s 6(6) of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act appears to conflict with s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act. 
Elias CJ, in the course of discussing the types of ends that may justify a limit on 
the right to be presumed innocent and the public interest in repressing drug taking, 
concludes: “[e]xclusion of the right to be presumed innocent in respect of such crimes 
would undermine the right enacted as a minimum standard”.170 
A purposive interpretation of the right and the legislative provision concerned 
are pivotal in ensuring that the full effect of the legislative provision on the right can be 
robustly understood in terms of both its subjective and objective effect.  This approach 
also ensures that the courts are giving proper effect to the law enacted by Parliament in 
reconciling seemingly inconsistent legislative provisions (the right and the limit) while 
maintaining the constitutional importance of the values protected by the Bill of Rights 
Act.  The purposive approach is not without its weaknesses and the courts have to be 
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careful in applying this interpretive approach to ensure comity is maintained between 
the courts and Parliament. 
B Challenges for the purposive approach in relation to the Bill of Rights Act 
The purposive approach to interpretation is not a complete answer to ensuring 
that the courts perform constitutional review consistently with the constitution.  
Legitimacy issues still arise for the courts in the manner they interpret rights and limits.  
Not only must the courts delve into the policy domain to gain information about the 
respective purposes of the right and the limit but there is the risk that the courts will 
extend, or diminish, a right; give that right a different status; attribute a provision with 
a purpose that Parliament did not intend; or define the legislative provision concerned 
too narrowly.  This section examines some of these challenges and also makes some 
observations for alternative approaches. 
1 Evidence of purpose 
In order to assess the public purpose of a legislative provision, judges need to 
have an appreciation of the policy reasons on which Parliament based its decision.  
Judges have not been involved in the policy process, heard public submissions, or 
participated in the debates in the House of Representatives; therefore, they are reliant 
on the arguments made by the parties to the proceedings about the public purpose of 
the provision.   In some situations, however, judges will be very familiar with the issues 
– particularly when the issues relate to criminal proceedings, as is the case in Hansen.   
In Hansen the Crown sought to introduce a new form of evidence to assist the 
courts in defining the purpose of the limit: legislative fact.  Legislative fact is the term 
used to describe the information pertaining to the nature of the problem; this 
information may not be recorded as part of legislative history of a Bill because they 
were issues addressed in briefings to the responsible Minister that were not of interest 
during the progress of the Bill through the House.  Anderson J describes legislative fact 
as: “material goes to the content of law and determination of policy, rather than to 
determination of facts that are in issue in the particular case.” 171   
The form legislative fact may take will vary according to the legislative 
provision in question, Elias CJ summarises the nature of the legislative fact in Hansen 
as:172 
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… evidence from police officers and other persons with knowledge relating to 
drug trafficking and use in New Zealand.  This evidence apparently included 
unpublished material, some said to be of a confidential nature, concerning 
patterns in the supply and use of cannabis in New Zealand and the policies and 
strategies of law enforcement authorities in combating illicit drug supply. 
 
The Crown sought the leave of the Supreme Court to introduce this evidence 
but all the judges declined to receive it because this evidence had not been considered 
in the earlier proceedings and the appellant challenged its late introduction of the 
evidence on that ground. Elias CJ, Blanchard J, Tipping J, and McGrath J did, however, 
express a willingness to hear this sort of evidence if it is available and submitted in 
accordance with procedure rules. 173   In addition, McGrath J states that such material 
would not be subject to the same requirements of the rules of evidence as adjudicative 
fact but can be admitted to the court through judicial notice.174 
While the judgments in Hansen do not discuss the specific value of legislative 
fact, the type of evidence adduced as legislative fact would be helpful in illuminating 
the purpose behind a legislative provision to provide context for why specific policy 
positions are adopted.  The fact that the Crown sought to adduce this evidence suggests 
that the Crown did not have serious concerns that judicial scrutiny of this information 
may undermine the constitution or parliamentary sovereignty. 
2 Judicial discussion of the nature of a right is essential 
The judgments of Blanchard, Tipping, and Anderson JJ in Hansen make 
passing reference to the right to be presumed innocent.  For example, the need to 
examine the right itself can only be inferred from Blanchard J’s acknowledgment of 
Richardson J’s approach in Noort (“the significance in the particular case of the values 
underlying the Bill of Rights Act”);175 and Tipping J’s summary of his approach to the 
s 5 analysis in this case (“Ascertain whether the meaning is apparently inconsistent 
with a relevant right or freedom”).176 
The absence of discussion about the nature of the right in the judgments of 
Blanchard J and Tipping J is troubling because it is imperative that the nature of the 
interests that the right seeks to protect are clear before determining whether a limit on a 
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right is justified. In this case, it appears that the discussion of the right is absent because 
the significance of the right is assumed given the cases that have gone before, or they 
rely on the discussion by Elias CJ and McGrath J of the right.  Burrows and Carter 
rightly emphasise that it is important for the court to use the purposive approach to 
discover rather than assume the purpose of the right.177   
While Blanchard J, when describing recent House of Lord’s decisions states 
that: “the presumption of innocence is a fundamental component of the absolute right 
to a fair trial”178 the lack of detail in Blanchard J’s judgment about the nature of the 
right leaves the analysis seeming incomplete because it does not engage with either the 
subjective or objective aspects of the right. If judges decide to rely on their colleagues 
or previous cases (in the interests of brevity) to reflect their assessment of the nature of 
the right then this should be stated in their judgment. 
In addition to considering the nature of the right it is crucial that the assessment 
of the effect of a legislative provision on a right considers both the subjective and 
objective aspects of the right.  While the subjective effect of a provision on the right is 
important to determine whether the provision does limit the right; an appreciation of 
the objective effect is essential in determining the long-term effect on the right and 
whether the limit is a proportionate response and, therefore, justified under s 5 of the 
Bill of Rights Act.  It is essential because the right not only protects the individual but 
is also a reflection of social and philosophical values about how the law should apply to 
everyone.  Focusing merely on the immediate subjective effect of the right ignores the 
ambulatory nature of the Bill of Rights Act and may, unnecessarily, constrain its 
application.  The courts’ practice of looking to the objective effect of the right is 
consistent with the purposive approach to interpreting rights and, along with using the 
scheme of the Act and the heritage of the right concerned to interpret the effect of the 
right, does not undermine parliamentary sovereignty but seeks to give full effect to the 
Bill of Rights Act. 
3 Altering the application of the Bill of Rights Act to a right 
Those concerned with judicial encroachments on parliamentary sovereignty 
would be well placed to draw attention to the danger of the courts giving some rights a 
higher status by, for example, determining that a right not be subject to s 5 of the Bill of 
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Rights Act.179  Chief Justice Elias in Hansen concludes that the right to be presumed 
innocent under s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act is an unqualified right – her conclusion 
is worth recording in full:180 
 
The presumption of innocence is unqualified in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act affirms. 
Moreover, while the International Covenant expressly permits restrictions on 
rights such as freedom of thought, conscience and religion and freedom of 
expression, and indicates the basis upon which such limitations can be made, 
no such licence is given in relation to the rights to fair trial and to be presumed 
innocent. It seems well arguable, from the otherwise unaccountable absence in 
the International Covenant of any register of values against which limitations 
can be considered, that these rights cannot be restricted as a matter of 
international obligation, although they may be subject to derogation in 
emergencies.  Whether or not that view is correct in international law, the same 
effect in my view follows from the nature of the right contained in s 25(c) of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.  
 
In reaching this conclusion the Chief Justice rejects the approach taken by the 
European Court of Human Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights; 
namely, that the right is not absolute and that a reverse onus is acceptable if there is a 
legitimate aim and the means are reasonably proportionate to a legitimate aim.181  This 
approach of Elias CJ to the right suggests that a limit on the right to be presumed 
innocent cannot be justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  However, while Elias 
CJ considers the right to be presumed innocent to be unqualified and, as such, any 
restriction amounts to denial of the right;182 the Chief Justice does “raise some matters 
that will require consideration in a case where s 5 is in issue.”183 While this seems 
contradictory because the discussion relates specifically to the right to be presumed 
innocent rather than generally to the application of s 5; it appears that the distinguishing 
feature is the criminal context in which the limit appears and that limits in the 
regulatory context, in some situations, may be able to be justified. 
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In commenting that some rights and freedoms are able to be subject to justified 
limits, Anderson J also makes the following point when comparing the right to be 
presumed innocent to that of the right to a fair trial:184 
 
The right to a fair trial is another example.  Whether in a particular case errors 
of law, or procedural deficiencies or other aberrations, do or do not render the 
trial unfair is a matter of degree and judgment.  But should a trial properly be 
stigmatised as unfair, s 5 could not be invoked to redeem it.  It is also fairly 
arguable that the burden of persuasion carried by the prosecution in criminal 
cases is so integral to a fair trial that no relaxation or reversal of it can be 
justified. 
 
 Without discussing the interests underpinning the right to be presumed innocent 
Anderson J does, however, conclude that s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act appears to 
be in conflict with s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act unless it can be redeemed by s 5 of 
the Bill of Rights Act.185   
 The issue of whether s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act should be applied to all rights, 
including those that contain internal modifiers or that are “unqualified” is still being 
debated.  For example, for a right with internal modifiers (such as “unreasonable”) the 
threshold for establishing a breach of the right could be lower and the threshold for 
justification could be higher.  Another alternative may be to apply s 5 to all rights but 
vary the intensity of review according to the nature of the right and the seriousness of 
the infringement the limit imposes on the right.186 
4 Scope of the right 
It is vital that the right is interpreted separately from the legislative provision 
concerned to prevent the scope of the right being inadvertently restricted. Elias CJ 
presents a timely warning to this effect in Hansen:187 
 
The first question is the interpretation of the right.  In ascertaining the meaning 
of the right, the criteria for justification are not relevant.  The meaning of the 
right is ascertained from the “cardinal values” it embodies.  Collapsing the 
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interpretation of the right and the s 5 justification is insufficiently protective of 
the right. 
 
It appears that the Chief Justice is cautioning against defining the nature of the 
right in light of the limit in issue, as this would have the effect of reading down the 
right.     The Chief Justice’s warning has significant merit; the right should be read free 
of the limit because the assessment of the merits of the limit should be carried out as 
part of the proportionality analysis under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  Furthermore, 
defining the nature of the right in light of the limit would place a difficult burden on the 
applicant to prove a negative (namely, that the right is not intended to cover the 
situation presented in a limit).   
Burrows and Carter describe the Court of Appeal decision in Noort as having 
held that “the competing requirements of both Acts could be reconciled by reading 
down the Bill of Rights provision so as to allow legal consultation by telephone 
only.”188 In this situation, the right has not, arguably, been read down but it is a 
recognition that it applies differently in different contexts and a person may only be 
able to get limited access to the right when the limit is justified; but this is the outcome 
of the assessment of the interests of both the right and the provision concerned rather 
than a redefinition of the right itself.  The right has not been interpreted to exclude a 
specific set of situations in which it was not intended for the right to apply.  This 
approach preserves the values and interests the right itself seeks to protect; relying on 
sections 5 and 6 of the Bill of Rights Act to be the mediator for the current social and 
political values. 
5 Interpretation and section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act 
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act states that: “Wherever an enactment can be 
given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning.”  Section 6 of the Bill of 
Rights Act offers the most potential to undermine Parliament because, theoretically, the 
courts could adopt a meaning that is consistent with the Bill of Rights Act but is 
inconsistent with the purpose and the meaning of the legislative provision concerned. 
A variety of approaches to s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act are evident across case 
law with the decisions in Noort, Moonen (No.1) and Hansen most commonly referred 
to in both the case law and commentary about the application of s 6 of the Bill of 
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Rights Act. These approaches generally take one of the following three views about the 
application of s 6: 
• apply s 6 as a complementary interpretation principle (for example, 
if the meaning of the legislative provision is ambiguous then the 
provision should be given a meaning that is consistent with the Bill 
of Rights Act)189 
• apply s 6 as a step in the analysis (for example, if the provision is an 
unjustified limitation on the right then s 6 is to be applied after s 5 of 
the Bill of Rights Act and before s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act)190 
• apply s 6 as both an interpretation principle and a step in the 
analysis.191 
 
Commentary about which approach Hansen endorses also varies, for example, 
Petra Butler assesses that both approaches apply192 while Wilberg contends that the 
decision in Hansen advocates for s 6 to apply only after the s 5 analysis has been 
completed and that potential interpretations that would constitute justified limitations 
also be considered under s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act. 193  Both commentators, 
however, note that Hansen does not provide a conclusive pronouncement of how to 
apply s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act and that the Supreme Court leaves this as an open 
question and acknowledged that different factors in each case will have an effect on 
how it should be applied.194  Regardless of where or how in the analysis the courts 
apply s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act; it needs to be performed consistently with the 
constitution: in a way that does not frustrate the will of Parliament.195 
The use of s 6 as an interpretation principle is unlikely to undermine the 
constitution if that interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the legislative 
provision concerned because it seeks to reconcile Parliament’s purpose in enacting both 
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the right in the Bill of Rights Act and the legislative provision concerned.  This 
approach is based on the assumption that Parliament does not intend to breach the Bill 
of Rights Act, and would only do so explicitly.  Furthermore, this approach preserves 
the position of Parliament as ultimate lawmaker and is consistent with the restriction 
placed on the courts when performing constitutional review by s 4 of the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
In the cases where the legislative provision concerned results in a limit on a 
right the constitutional issues become more complex.  Commentators have attributed 
Hansen with concluding that if a limit is justified then there is no recourse to s 6 after 
analysis under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.196  This approach is uncontroversial from a 
constitutional perspective because it shows deference for Parliament’s selected 
approach to the policy matter and objective the legislative provision intends to achieve.   
The application of s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act to a limit that has been found to 
be unjustified, as identified in Hansen, poses a more controversial question because it 
involves the courts looking for an alternative interpretation of the legislative provision 
despite the fact that the initial interpretation does not support a natural meaning 
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act.  In relation to this assessment, Petra Butler notes 
that the decision in Hansen requires that:197 
 
To be legitimate the meaning must be “tenable” … or “genuinely open”…. If 
there is such a tenable, BORA consistent meaning then s 6 requires it to be 
adopted.  If, however, the provision is only reasonably capable of bearing a 
meaning inconsistent with BORA this has to be adopted whether or not it 
places a justified limit on a right (s 4 BORA). 
 
The post-section 5 analysis of a legislative provision could be seen as a way of 
the courts trying to reconcile a constitutional statute and a legislative provision to give 
proper effect to the law and is prefaced on the assumption that Parliament does not 
intend to enact laws that are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act. In this context the 
application of s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act almost has a remedial quality that seeks to 
give better effect to the right concerned.  In applying s 6 after s 5 of the Bill of Rights 
Act, the courts need to guard against substituting a new meaning that is inconsistent 
with the purpose of the provision.  For example, if the courts identified an alternative 
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option as part of the proportionality analysis that is consistent with the purpose of the 
legislative provision concerned and it is a meaning that is “tenable” or “genuinely 
open” to the courts then adopting this meaning, depending on the facts of the case, may 
be acceptable so long as it does not (in effect if not in form) contravene s 4 of the Bill 
of Rights Act.  
Webb observes that the courts have, to date, taken a conservative approach to s 
6 of the Bill of Rights Act in relation to review of legislation: “It is also clear though, 
that the Supreme Court, unlike its United Kingdom counterpart, will not use section 6 
to subvert the clear language of section 4.”  Given the risk to the constitution of any 
other approach, the current approach of the courts in relation to review of legislation is 
commendable. 
6 Concluding observations 
The application of the purposive approach and interpretation principles to the 
Bill of Rights Act by the courts does not undermine the constitution or frustrate the will 
of New Zealand as represented by Parliament through: 
• interpreting and applying the legislative provisions too narrowly so 
as to, in effect, render it void 
• substituting a meaning that is inconsistent with the clear meaning of 
the legislation 
• supplementing the legislation to fill a “gap” in the law in such a way 
as to render the legislative provision ineffectual. 
 
Burrows and Carter also rightly identify that this approach is not without 
dangers but conclude that the overall outcome is beneficial because “it produces a 
commonsense approach to interpretation that tries to attain the ends that the frames of 
the Act had in view.”198 The courts use of the purposive approach and other the 
interpretation principles in constitutionally reviewing legislation are not encroaching on 
Parliament’s domain by making or unmaking laws, or undermining legislation by 
substituting interpretations that are inconsistent with the purpose of those provisions. 
The courts must continue, however, to be vigilant and avoid interpreting rights or 
legislative provisions in a way that would compromise the constitution, especially 
when applying s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act to legislative provisions that are unjustified 
limits. 
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C Proportionality Analysis 
The distinguishing feature of constitutional review of legislation is that the 
courts review the substance of the law; this gives rise to the critique that in performing 
this analysis the courts are assessing policy and are straying into the domain of 
Parliament and the Executive.  To assess whether a limit is justified under the Bill of 
Rights Act the courts have employed a proportionality test.199  Joseph describes the 
proportionality test as a defining feature of constitutional review: 200 
 
Constitutional review calls for evaluation of the harm caused by the decision 
and the value or importance of the public purpose the decision-maker seeks to 
achieve.  Each of the new grounds varies slightly in method: judicial review 
based on the Bill of Rights Act is entirely contents-based and substantive…. 
 
There are three aspects of the proportionality test that could be described as 
encroaching on Parliament’s domain, the assessment of: the importance of the public 
purpose of the limit; whether the limit is the least intrusive option; and where, 
ultimately, the balance of public interests lies (with the right or with the limit).  Each of 
these aspects of the analysis requires the courts to assess Parliament’s decision in 
enacting the limit.  In recognition of the respective constitutional roles of the judiciary 
and the legislature, and the need to ensure comity between these branches of 
government the courts may apply judicial deference or restraint when making an 
assessment.  Before examining how the courts apply the proportionality test using the 
Supreme Court decision in Hansen it is helpful to summarise the test and the judicial 
approach to deference to provide context.   
The proportionality test under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act draws on the test 
articulated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Oakes.  For example, in Hansen the 
majority of judges referred to Oakes as being instructive for the justification analysis 
with Elias CJ summarising the test in the following terms:201 
 
Where s 5 is however in issue because an enactment inconsistent with the 
right, properly interpreted, is sought to be justified, the approach taken by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R v Oakes and the cases which have followed it is 
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helpful.  The objective sought to be achieved by the limiting provision must be 
of sufficient importance to warrant infringement of a fundamental human right.  
The limitation must be no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve the 
purpose.  The objective against which a provision is justified cannot be wider 
than can be achieved by the limitation of the right. 
 
From the outset, judges acknowledged that the proportionality analysis under 
the Bill of Rights Act would necessarily involve analysis of public policy and require 
some value judgements.  While the making of value judgements could been seen as a 
stumbling block, Richardson J, in Noort, notes that: “a great deal of helpful case law in 
other jurisdiction as to the principled bases on which Courts ought to proceed in 
making their assessment under the section.”202  Such analysis is not, however, without 
boundaries.  Later in Quilter, Thomas J’s dissenting judgment offered a warning about 
venturing too far into policy analysis when recognising that the current law does not 
support the plaintiff’s desired outcome:203 
 
Inevitably the jurist is led into areas of policy, such as the timing of any 
change to the law, the method by which the law should be changed, and the 
general acceptance or receptiveness of the community to any such law change.  
At once, the jurist will appreciate that he or she has strayed beyond the bounds 
of legal inquiry into the foreign territory of “political” policy. 
 
The issues Thomas J identifies above are largely strategic policy issues about 
the political will and desirability of change, not what form that change should take. 
While Thomas J’s judgment was dissenting, the judges all agreed, rightly or wrongly, 
that the issue of gay marriage was one that should be left to Parliament and could not 
be reconciled with the existing law using s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
Tipping J observes in Moonen (No1) that the final assessment about whether a 
limitation is justified is one which: “the Court is obliged to make on behalf of the 
society which it serves and after considering all the issues which may have a bearing on 
the individual case, whether they be social, legal, moral, economic, administrative, 
ethical or otherwise.”204 When discussing the application of this element of the Oakes 
test in New Zealand, Rishworth draws attention to Justice Tipping’s comments in 
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Moonen (No.1) that this element largely involves a value judgment by the courts on 
behalf of society before noting that “[t]he touchstone for the s.5 inquiry – freedom and 
democracy – is not discussed.”205  Tipping J’s judgment in Hansen does, however, 
aptly respond to such a critique. 
The test applied in New Zealand is akin to that applied in the United Kingdom 
where the proportionality test has also adopted for assessing the consistency of 
legislation with human rights.  Jowell in his article about the approach in the United 
Kingdom identifies, after noting salient decisions, the proportionality test as the 
touchstone of constitutional review206 and identified it as a fourfold test:207 
 
Proportionality involves a sophisticated four stage process, asking the 
following questions: 
(1) Did the action pursue a legitimate aim? 
(2) Were the means employed suitable to achieve that aim? 
(3) Could the aim have been achieved by a less restrictive alternative? 
(4) Is the derogation justified overall in the interests of a democratic society? 
This fourfold test contains a carefully constructed set of criteria which are 
designed to ensure that a prima facie violative of a fundamental democratic 
right is not lightly sanctioned. 
 
Similarly, Wilberg, in discussing the decision in Hansen, summarises the 
proportionality test employs four factors to been weighed up but she arranges them 
differently:208 
 
on the one hand, 
− the importance of the right in the relevant context and 
− the severity of the limit on the right; 
on the other hand, 
− the importance of the objective in the relevant context and 
− the effectiveness of the limit in serving the objective, compared to 
the effectiveness of any available alternatives. 
 
In formulating the elements of constitutional review, Joseph draws on the 
judgment of Richardson J in Noort about the application of s 5 as a matter of weighing 
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various different interests,209 and the following three elements reflect the 
proportionality test: 
• the value or importance of the public purpose the decision-maker 
seeks to achieve 
• whether the desired public purpose(s) (the ends) could be achieved 
in less intrusive ways (the means) 
• where the balance of public interest or welfare lies.210 
 
While the proportionality analysis under the Bill of Rights Act could be 
considered more akin to an art rather than a science given there are many different 
descriptions of the test, however, the test is in essence: whether the limit is a 
proportionate response to a problem given the constitutional significance of the right 
concerned.211  In some situations the court may show deference to Parliament because 
the nature of the issue places the final call within Parliament’s domain; this is another 
way the courts seek to maintain comity with Parliament.212   
The crux of the concern about judges assessing public policy under s 5 of the 
Bill of Rights Act appears to be linked to an apprehension that they may go beyond the 
assessment and substitute their own view for that of Parliament’s position. The separate 
judgments in Hansen demonstrate a ready awareness of this concern and that the 
substitution of views would encroach of the decision-making domain of Parliament.  
For example, in Hansen, Tipping J notes that such encroachment is something the 
judiciary guards against: 213 
 
The courts’ function is not immutably to substitute its own view for that of the 
legislature.  If the court agrees with the legislature that the limit is justified, no 
further issue arises.  If the court does not agree, it must nevertheless ask itself 
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whether the legislature was entitled, to use Lord Hoffmann’s word, to come to 
the conclusion under challenge.  It is only if Parliament was not so entitled that 
the court should find the limit to be unjustified. 
 
Tipping J is careful to recognise the role of Parliament in setting the policy, and 
yet is transparent and practical about the fact that courts cannot make a sensible 
analysis under s 5 without reference to policy.  In essence, judicial deference or 
restraint is shown to Parliament because of its democratic mandate to govern and 
determine policy and the law.   
There is no bright line test for when deference or restraint should be shown, or 
to what extent it affects the analysis in a case. The courts, as observed by Anderson J in 
Hansen, are sensible to the fact that the constraints of judicial process on making a 
fulsome inquiry may mean that the courts have to show judicial deference to 
Parliament in some circumstances.214  The decision in Hansen offers some insight into 
how judicial deference or restraint is applied.  As identified by Tipping J in Hansen the 
challenge comes in getting the balance right between the role of Parliament in 
democratically setting the limit, and the judicial role in upholding “rights and freedoms 
and not to allow them to be limited otherwise than on a convincing basis”.215 In his 
judgment Tipping J offers a figurative and helpful description about the relationship: 
 
The courts’ view may be that, in order to qualify, the limitation must fall 
within the bull’s-eye.  Parliament’s appraisal of the matter has the answer lying 
outside the bull’s-eye but still on the target.  The size of the target beyond the 
bull’s-eye will depend on the subject matter.  The margin of judgment or 
discretion left to Parliament represents that area of the target outside the bull’s-
eye.  Parliament’s appraisal must not, of course, miss the target altogether.  If 
that is so Parliament has exceeded its area of discretion or judgment.  …The 
courts’ job is to delineate the size of the target and then say whether 
Parliament’s measure hits the target or misses it.216 
 
For ease of reference this description will be called: “Tipping’s target 
metaphor”.  Tipping J also uses a conceptual spectrum to define the potential limits of 
the courts proportionality analysis under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act with “major 
political, social or economic decisions” at one end and “matters that have a substantial 
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legal content at the other end” with the courts exercising a greater intensity of review of 
those matters more at the legal content end of the spectrum.217  There are weaknesses 
with this approach because: “the allocation of scarce public resources can often 
intersect with questions which, from a different standpoint, may seem more legal than 
political.”218 The court’s discussion of judicial deference and restraint to Parliament 
reveals that its application will depend on the facts of the case 
1 Assessing the value and importance of an objective 
The first step of the proportionality analysis is to assess the objective or public 
purpose of the limit.  Joseph’s construction of the element of constitutional review 
characterises this as an assessment of “the value or importance of the public purpose 
the decision-maker seeks to achieve”.  The courts, to assess this element, have largely 
adopted the language employed in Oakes and ask whether the objective is significant 
and important which requires an assessment of whether the objective addresses a matter 
that is pressing and substantial.219 
The separate judgments in Hansen take different approaches to assessing the 
whether the public purpose served by s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act is of value or 
importance.  Chief Justice Elias’ judgment does not specifically discuss the public 
purpose, the Chief Justice instead considers s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act in the 
broader context of the right concerned and other criminal offending concluding that: 
“[i]t is not at all clear that there is any principled basis upon which the risk of non-
persuasion and therefore the risk of wrongful conviction is properly transferred to 
someone accused of drug dealing.”220  In contrast, Anderson J considers the importance 
of the objective of combating “the widespread and destructive use of and dealing in 
controlled drugs” as so obvious that “[t]he health, safety and economic implications are 
of a degree which needs no elaboration.”221 
In contrast, Blanchard, Tipping, and McGrath JJ in Hansen all conclude that the 
public purpose is important because it responds to a general concern that is “pressing 
and substantial”.222 All three of these judgments refer to either ‘Parliament’ or the 
‘legislature’ in the course of determining whether the public purpose is important.   
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McGrath J, in concluding that there is an important objective defers completely to 
Parliament:223 
 
Whether that is a pressing concern in New Zealand is a question of social 
policy on which democratic principle calls for respect for the legislature’s 
assessment.  Having regard to the legislature’s constitutional responsibility it 
would be rare in New Zealand for the courts to decide that the objective of the 
legislature in criminalising certain behaviour was in pursuit of a policy goal 
that was not a legitimate aim.  In any event, I have no hesitation in concluding 
that both aspects of the legislature’s objective, as described, amount to a 
pressing social concern in New Zealand of sufficient importance that its 
pursuit may legitimately override protected freedoms. 
 
Blanchard J takes a different approach by attributing Parliament with a 
conscious decision to override the Bill of Rights Act to give effect to the policy 
objectives behind the provision.224  While this is a different approach to that of 
McGrath J and Anderson J, the effect is the same: there is no independent assessment 
of the value or importance of the objective. 
Deference to Parliament when determining whether the objective is of value or 
important is problematic because it is easy to get drawn into a de facto assumption that 
if Parliament has legislated for X, then X is of value or importance because Parliament 
would intervene with legislation if that intervention was necessary and important. 
While this approach would be in keeping with protection of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, an impartial assessment of the objective of a limit can be 
achieved without encroaching on Parliament’s domain.  Such an approach is evident 
from the judgment of Tipping J because while Tipping J describes the objective as 
“Parliament’s objective” to locate the objective in the democratic decision-making 
body he makes an independent assessment of that objective stating:225 
 
I am satisfied that Parliament’s objective was sufficiently important to justify 
some limitation of the presumption of innocence.  Dealing in illegal drugs is a 
major social concern and has the capacity to do immeasurable harm to society 
and its individual citizens.  The presumption contained in s 6(6) of the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1975 is obviously designed to make the task of establishing guilt 
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easier for the prosecution. That will indirectly have some deterrent effect. 
These interrelated objectives relate to a matter which I am satisfied is one of 
serious and pressing social concern. 
 
In “The Charter Dialogue between the Courts and Legislatures”, Hogg and 
Bushell observe that the Canadian courts have rarely found that a law does not have a 
“pressing and substantial” purpose before noting two exceptions, as at 1997, in which 
the courts did find that the objective did not meet the threshold:  R v Big M Drug Mart 
Ltd in which the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the federal Lord Days Act 
because the purpose to “compel the observance of the Christian Sabbath” was 
inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of religion; and Sommerville v Canada (AG) 
(1996) in which the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the objectives behind the limits 
on third party election spending and advertising blackouts. 226 
While deference and restraint is a vital tool for ensuring comity between the 
courts and Parliament, caution should be exercised because unquestioning deference to 
Parliament about whether an objective is important may, depending on the case, inhibit 
the courts ability to make a fair and impartial assessment about whether the limit is a 
proportionate response to the problem.  
2 Judicial analysis of the policy options 
As part of the proportionality assessment, the courts assess whether the desired 
purposes (the ends) could be achieved in less intrusive ways (the means).227  An 
argument often made is that judges lack institutional capacity to perform the 
proportionality test because, unlike elected representatives, they do not have access to 
the policy reasons and views of the public on which the decisions are based and that 
this makes such an assessment by the courts unconstitutional.228  This concern is 
especially relevant when courts assess whether the limit impairs the right as little as is 
reasonably necessary because the courts generally compare the means chosen with 
alternative options.   
The comparison of alternative options involves policy analysis through 
identifying different ways in which Parliament could have approached the problem to 
achieve the objective.  The approach the courts take to assessing this element of the 
proportionality test is derived from Oakes and was originally a requirement that there 
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be “as little interference as possible with the right”.  However, as noted in Rishworth, 
Dickson CJ later modified this element in R v Edward Books and Art229 to require that 
rights be limited “as little as is reasonably possible.”230  A similar restatement of this 
element can be found in the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in Chaulk.231 
The description of how to approach of this element in Hansen varies across the 
judgments and is somewhat confusing.  Anderson J appears to take the more restrictive 
approach from Oakes but refers to Chaulk when he recasts the element to read:232  
 
A limitation of an affirmed right or freedom will not be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society unless it: … (c) in light of its intended 
purpose, is the least possible impairment; and … 
 
Similarly, McGrath J in Hansen accepts this aspect as a both “crucial and 
difficult” part of the proportionality analysis and cites the guidelines set by the Court of 
Appeal in Moonen (No1) as authority.233  While Moonen (No.1) refers to Oakes for this 
aspect it does not discuss the restatement ‘as little as is reasonably necessary’ of the 
element by the Canadian Supreme Court in Chaulk or Edwards.234  When discussing 
the application of this element, McGrath J frames the question as: “whether the 
measure intrudes on the presumption of innocence as little as possible, in other words 
whether there is minimal impairment”; he then goes on to state that the alternative has 
to have a “similar level of effectiveness”.235 
Blanchard J starts by noting that assessing the means chosen to achieve the 
objective must impair the right or freedom as “little as possible” is an analytical 
element for determination and relies on Oakes for this proposition.236  However, when 
applying the element Blanchard J states that the decision in Chaulk acknowledges that 
“a choice could be made from a range of means which impaired the right as little as 
was reasonably necessary.”237 
Tipping J summarises the question as “does the limiting measure impair the 
right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its 
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purpose?”238 and sets out the following description of how this element can be 
satisfied:239 
 
The court must be satisfied that the limit imposed on the presumption of 
innocence is no greater than is reasonably necessary to achieve Parliament’s 
objective.  I prefer that formulation to one which says that the limit must 
impair the right as little as possible.  The former approach builds in appropriate 
latitude to Parliament; the latter would unreasonably circumscribe Parliament’s 
discretion.  In practical terms this inquiry involves the court in considering 
whether Parliament might have sufficiently achieved its objective by another 
method involving less cost to the presumption of innocence. 
 
Two accounts of the Supreme Court’s approach to this element in Hansen as 
part of the test under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act offer differing views about the 
application of this element.  Wilberg’s article in “The Bill of Rights and other 
enactments” considers that there is a two-to-two divide between restating the original 
Oakes test and the qualified ‘reasonably necessary’ recasting of this element misses an 
opportunity to clarify the approach post Moonen (No.1).  In contrast, Petra Butler’s 
discussion of Hansen observes:240 
 
Rather those judges explicitly or implicitly accepted that in line with later 
Canadian authority Parliament was “not required to search for and to adopt the 
absolutely least intrusive means of obtaining its objective”.   
 
How this test is configured is material to whether the courts may be intruding 
on the domain of Parliament; in contrast to the threshold being “as little as possible”, 
the “as little as reasonably possible” or “as little as reasonably necessary” 
configurations give the courts room to apply deference.  The “as little as reasonably 
necessary” configuration recognises that there may be more than one reasonable policy 
response to a problem that falls within an acceptable range of policy options given their 
limited effect on the right.  While the courts statements about how to approach the 
element bear out the two-to-two divide, consideration of how the analysis was 
performed, not just what was said, bears out the conclusion that the “little as reasonably 
necessary” test is that which is applied by the courts.  For example, McGrath J and 
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Anderson J build in the reasonableness by requiring the alternative to have a similar 
level of effectiveness (McGrath J) or to be viewed in light of the purpose (Anderson J). 
In applying this element in Hansen Elias CJ, Tipping, McGrath, and Anderson 
JJ identify alternative approaches that would be a less intrusive means of achieving the 
objective; in contrast Blanchard J considers that the reverse onus resulting from the 
presumption in s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act is the only effective approach for 
achieving the objective. The discussion below of how the courts applied this test 
demonstrates that it can be done in a way that preserves the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament while ensuring the integrity of the analysis and objective of the Bill of 
Rights Act to promote and protect human rights. 
In the course of describing different types of evidential and legal burdens in 
criminal proceedings Elias CJ explores whether an evidential burden would have been 
a less intrusive means of achieving the objective.  Specifically, Elias CJ considers 
whether a presumption of fact is a viable alternative; a presumption of fact: “creates an 
evidential burden on the party against whose interests the presumption operates by 
requiring him to point to evidence upon which the trier of fact could find against the 
presumption.”241  After determining that s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act cannot be 
construed that way under s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act, the Chief Justice concludes:242 
 
It is difficult to see that evidential difficulties for the prosecution in the present 
case could not have been sufficiently addressed by a presumption of fact which 
leaves the onus of proof on the prosecution. 
 
Tipping J considers that, in this case, an evidential burden is the “only serious 
candidate” as an alternative, noting that:243 
 
The evidential burden gives rise to less risk that a person who had no purpose 
of supply would be convicted because he was unable to rebut the presumption.  
The persuasive burden has a greater capacity to catch those who are not 
actually guilty of possession for supply.  
 
Tipping J considers that this alternative would put the Crown in a “materially 
better position than if there was no presumption at all”, by giving the Crown a forensic 
                                                 
241 Hansen, above n 8, at [33] per Elias CJ. 
242 Ibid, at [39] - [44] per Elias CJ. 
243 Ibid, at [127] per Tipping J. 
 
70 
advantage that would have a deterrence effect also.244  With this in mind, Tipping J 
concludes that s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act “impairs the right to be presumed 
innocent to a greater extent than is reasonably necessary to achieve Parliament’s 
objective”.245 
McGrath J considers that there is an “obvious alternative” for approaching the 
objective “of drying up supplies of illicit drugs and facilitating detection and 
prosecution of drug dealing, namely by imposing only an evidential onus on the 
accused.”246   McGrath J notes the challenging position Parliament is in making such 
decisions especially in light of the evidence from Police before select committee that 
proof of dealing intention is problematic, but then goes on to caution that:247 
 
The problem of proof of purpose in this context should not, however, be over-
emphasised.  Even in the absence of any statutory presumption an intent to 
supply drugs may be inferred from evidence of the quantity of drugs found in a 
person’s possession. 
 
McGrath J elaborates on this point with an example and then, like Tipping J, 
considers that the evidential onus would have some effects that are advantageous to the 
prosecution.248  McGrath J also examines the approach in England and the Australian 
State of Victoria to support the conclusion that an evidential onus is consistent with the 
presumption of innocence and will not unnecessarily hamper the prosecution of drug 
dealing offences finally concluding that an evidential burden is a less intrusive means 
of achieving the objective.249 
Anderson J takes a different approach from his colleagues.  After concluding 
that there is not a rational connection between the Expert Committee’s advice about the 
trigger levels for setting the thresholds and the purpose of the limit on the right to be 
presumed innocent, Anderson J explores whether the Expert Committee’s opinion itself 
could be used as evidence in prosecutions for drug dealing:250 
 
The trigger level is fixed in light of the opinion of the Expert Committee, 
indicating that the opinion is factual information from which, as a 
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generalisation, a purpose may be inferred.  If that is so, the quality of the 
opinion is essentially evidential, not probative.  Its evidential value will vary 
according to the whole of the factual context.  To the extent that an opinion has 
evidential relevance it could properly be put before a court, but the 
presumption goes further than that.   
 
Anderson J does acknowledge the “significant issues of cost, convenience, and 
practicability in putting before a court the opinion of an expert body” but considers that 
there are ways to ameliorate these issues and goes on to draw a comparison with an 
experienced member of the Police providing evidence about the conduct of drug 
dealers.251  Anderson J concludes, in light of this alternative, that s 6(6) of the Misuse 
of Drugs Act is too intrusive. 252 
In considering whether there are less intrusive means of achieving the objective, 
Blanchard J’s analysis diverges from that of his colleagues because he concludes that 
there is no effective alternative.  Blanchard J starts by reiterating the prosecutorial 
difficulty in proving the intention of possession for street dealing.253  Blanchard J 
considers that the alternative of an evidential burden would, in practical terms, have the 
same effect a legal burden on the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused had the requisite purpose.  Blanchard J goes on to conclude that: the 
presumption in s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act is the only effective means of 
remedying the prosecutorial difficulty and, therefore, to achieve the public purpose. 254  
In the lead up to Blanchard J’s discussion of this element, the judgment is bereft of 
analysis about the nature of the right to be presumed innocent; this may be why the 
discussion of alternatives appears lopsided and to focus more on the policy objective.  
For four of the judges in Hansen the presence of an effective alternative for 
achieving the objective means that s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act could not be 
considered to limit the right as little as was reasonably necessary.  As for judicial 
analysis of the importance of the objective; the analysis of the means of achieving the 
objective strays into the domain of Parliament because it not only challenges the choice 
made by Parliament but also looks at different policy options that could have been 
adopted.   
However, there are two factors that save the courts and continue to show respect 
for the role of Parliament. First, the courts are looking at whether the means falls within 
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a range of reasonable alternatives, not whether the means is the least intrusive way of 
achieving the objective. Secondly, as Wilberg observes, the fact that Tipping and 
McGrath JJ continue their analysis even after concluding that the minimal impairment 
threshold had not been reached suggesting that this test “is not a hurdle which must be 
passed but rather a factor that feeds into the final proportionality test”.255 
3 Balancing of the public interests  
The final aspect of the proportionality test is to determine where the balance lies 
by weighing up the public interest in the right with the public interest in the limit.  This 
assessment necessarily draws together all the threads of the other elements of the 
analysis: the nature of the right, the effect of the limit, the objective of the limit, and 
whether the limit only limits the right “as little as is reasonably necessary”.   
Rishworth observes that the courts have largely adopted the approach of the 
Canadian Supreme Court using Oakes as the touchstone for assessing where the 
balance lies.  In the course of discussing Oakes, Rishworth notes the position taken by 
Hogg that this branch of the Oakes test is redundant because: “[a] judgment that the 
effect of the law were too severe would surely mean that the objective was not 
sufficiently important to justify limiting a Charter right.”256  Rishworth’s counters 
Hogg’s position by referring to the decision Thomson Newspapers Co v Canada 
(Attorney-General) that states that:257   
 
The third stage of the proportionality analysis provides an opportunity to 
assess, in light of the practical and contextual details which are elucidated in 
the first and second stages, whether the benefits which accrue from the 
limitation are proportional to its deleterious effects measured by the values 
underlying the Charter 
 
This approach is consistent with the observation made by Wilberg that the 
preceding elements of the proportionality analysis are factors rather than hurdles. 
Nevertheless, this final assessment is the most controversial part of constitutional 
review from the orthodox perspective because the courts are, in effect, revisiting the 
decision already made by Parliament about where the public interest lies: with the right 
or with the limit.  The matters considered as part of the balancing analysis will vary 
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according to the facts of the case; there are, however, some regular attendees: the effect 
of the limit, the reasonableness of over options, and the public interest associated with 
both the right and the limit. The complexity of the balancing analysis is evident from 
the varying approaches taken in each judgment in Hansen. 
 
(a)  Consideration of the effect of the limit in the balancing analysis 
 
If the effect of the limit on the right is minimal and the limit comes within the 
range of reasonable options, then the courts are likely to find that the limit is justified 
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  If the effect of the limit is not minimal then the 
courts are likely to increase the intensity of their review under s 5 of the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
In conducting his final assessment under the proportionality analysis, Blanchard 
J focuses on the risk of wrongful conviction under s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
and whether that risk is real or theoretical.258 Blanchard J expresses doubt about 
whether there would be a negative effect on the right to be presumed innocent for cases 
under s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act, but he does not discuss the broader public 
interest in the right to be presumed innocent in his consideration of this element:259 
 
In a very small number of borderline cases – of which the present case is 
certainly not one – it is possible that a user of illegal drugs could be convicted 
of possession for supply where there existed a reasonable doubt about purpose.  
But the consequence of the limitation of the presumption of innocence for such 
persons (if in fact there are any) would not be disproportionate to the overall 
net gain to society from the effective operation of the reverse onus.  The 
disincentive to dealers provided by the existence of the reverse onus in s 6(6) 
and the practical ineffectiveness for the prosecution of anything less than such 
an onus must, in my view, be given the greater weight.   
 
After noting that s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act requires courts to consider the 
legitimacy of statutory provisions in their societal context and that includes the fact that 
s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act also applies to other drugs controlled by that Act, 
Blanchard J concludes that the limit imposed by s 6(6) of that Act is not 
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disproportionate.260  Blanchard J is the only judge in Hansen to conclude that s 6(6) of 
the Misuse of Drugs Act is a justified limit under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.261 
Blanchard J’s judgment reflects judicial restraint in relation to Parliament’s decision to 
enact the limit in s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act. 
In contrast to the judgment of Blanchard J, when Tipping J revisits the issue of 
the risks associated with setting trigger levels, including the risk of wrongly convicting 
people, he reaches a different conclusion:262 
 
It is the uncertain extent of the potential disparity between the level of 
probability which arises from where the presumptive level is set and the 
fundamental general need for the Crown to prove every element of the 
offending beyond reasonable doubt which lies at the heart of my conclusion 
that s 6(6) represents a disproportionate response to what is undoubtedly a 
matter of genuine social concern.  There is no sufficient basis upon which I can 
conclude that Parliament was entitled to view the matter otherwise.   
 
The different conclusions of analysis of the effect of the limit of the right in the 
context of the proportionality test may also reflect that Tipping J presumes that 
Parliament does not intend to limit rights; whereas, Blanchard J presumes that if 
Parliament has enacted a limit it is intended as a justified limit. 
 
(b) Consideration of less intrusive options in the balancing analysis 
 
The availability of options that would be less intrusive on the right is material in 
the assessments by Elias CJ, Tipping, McGrath, and Anderson JJ.  For example, 
Tipping J concludes that while the less intrusive alternative of an evidential onus would 
not be as advantageous as the presumption in s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act:263 
 
…in contrast to the lesser presumption, the Crown’s advantage under s 6(6) 
represents a disproportionate response to the problem being addressed.  Under 
the lesser presumption the risk of wrongful convictions would be significantly 
reduced and the effectiveness of the presumption from the Crown’s point of 
view would not be inappropriately lessened. 
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While the judgment of Tipping J is explicit about this consideration, it can only be 
inferred from analysis in the other judgments. 
 
(c) Consideration of the public interest in the right in the balancing analysis 
 
Often the focus of the balancing analysis is on the limit and its objective, but 
examining the public interest in the right is an essential part of the balancing analysis 
and it is informed by the earlier analysis of the subjective (immediate) and objective 
(long term) aspects of the right.  Both of the right and the limit were enacted by 
Parliament, and the courts are being asked to determine where the public interest lies; 
this is a complex and inherently democratic decision – one that is usually reserved for 
Parliament but sees the courts acting as a check to ensure that the reasons for 
Parliament’s determination are transparent. 
Tipping J, like Blanchard J, spends little time in his judgment discussing the 
nature of the right.  However, the discussion of the public interest supporting the right 
is material in Tipping J reaching the conclusion that the Crown has not demonstrated 
that the right to be presumed innocent is outweighed by the objective of s 6(6) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act because they failed to show that the provision has “created 
demonstrably greater social benefits than the damage inflicted on the presumption of 
innocence.” 264  Anderson J takes a different approach that combines the subjective and 
objective effects of the limit on the right.  After concluding that there is no rational 
connection between the objective and s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act, and discussing 
the means for advancing the objective, Anderson J concludes it is not a proportionate 
response because dealers can change behaviour to evade and that the reverse onus most 
affects those for whom the evidence is marginal one way or the other before concluding 
that:265  
 
Because of prosecutorial difficulty in proving a positive, an accused who does 
not have equality of arms in terms of resources, and may lack articulateness, is 
forced to carry the even heavier burden of proving a negative.  That such 
negative is subjective and intangible only exacerbates the difficulty for an 
accused. 
 
                                                 
264 Ibid, at [137] per Tipping J. 
265 Ibid, at [280] per Anderson J. 
 
76 
Elias CJ states that, in her view, consideration of s 5 does not arise in this case 
but that she will provide some thoughts on the sorts of considerations should they 
arise.266  In this context, the Chief Justice observes that in weighing up whether a limit 
is justified: “the ends which might justify a limitation of the human right to be 
presumed innocent must relate to the particular difficulties of proof or detection which 
are the immediate reason for the limitation of the right.”267 After considering such 
matters, the Chief Justice concludes that: “[s]imply making it easier to secure 
convictions is not a principled basis for imposing a reverse onus of proof”.268   
McGrath J’s discussion of where the balance lies starts by noting the 
importance of the right to be presumed innocent and that the effect of the reverse onus 
on that right is substantial.269  McGrath J then goes on discuss how the burden faced by 
the accused, despite them having material knowledge of intention, would be 
detrimental to the accused in this case because:  
• proving a state of mind is a more difficult exercise than proving a 
simple fact  
• the defence of holding drugs for personal use requires the accused to 
acknowledge the possession and “that acknowledgement of itself is 
likely to demean the accused in the eyes of the jury” 
• witnesses to support the accused persons version are highly unlikely 
to be prepared to give evidence in court to that effect.270 
 
McGrath J goes on to observe that in situations where there is a large quantity 
of drugs it would combine with the effects of the above and the accused “may make it 
very difficult, if not impossible, to discharge the burden placed on him despite his 
primary knowledge of what he intended.”271  McGrath J finally concludes, drawing on 
the effect of the limit and the right, that s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act is a 
disproportionate means of achieving the public purpose of curbing the illicit supply of 
controlled drugs stating:272 
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Overall, in the context of a provision which seriously intrudes on a core value 
of the criminal justice system, it seems to me that the disadvantages on an 
accused are disproportionate to those on the prosecution, which will only 
commence its case if it is able to prove that the accused was caught in 
possession of a particular quantity of drugs from which fact alone inferences of 
a purpose of supply of varying strength will be available. 
 
Both Elias CJ and Anderson J frame their consideration of whether the limit 
poses a justified limit on the right in the broader context of criminal offending.  Elias 
CJ takes a theoretical route when examining the objective in the broader context of 
criminal offending comparing this situation to the paradox in criminal procedure by 
quoting from the judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in S v Coetzee in 
which Sachs J states:273 
 
The starting point of any balancing enquiry where constitutional rights are 
concerned must be that the public interest in ensuring that innocent people are 
not convicted and subjected to ignominy and heavy sentences, massively 
outweighs the public interest in ensuring that a particular criminal is brought to 
book.   
 
The Chief Justice reproduces the fulsome explanation by Sachs J which 
includes the observation that the “prevalence and seriousness” of the crime are not 
necessarily material justifications because it is easy to apply such justifications to a 
range of offending.  Anderson J adopts a similar position to challenge the objective of 
the limit in the context of other crimes of social concern:274 
 
Limiting such use and its effects, including by criminal process, is an 
important social objective.  However, it is not only criminal dealing in drugs 
which is of great social concern.  Sexual abuse and other forms of serious 
violence, even when not drug related, are also matters of grave concern, yet 
our society does not and should not contemplate reversing the onus of proof in 
those types of case.  In my view, the misuse of drugs is no more important than 
those types of criminality. 
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Elias CJ and Anderson J’s discussion of the broader context illustrate how the 
objective (repressing drug taking) can be weighed not just against the subjective 
interests right (that is, to s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act) but also the objective 
interest in the right generally (ensuring innocent people are not convicted).   
With the exception of the judgment of Blanchard J; the Supreme Court, while 
exercising deference in respect of some elements of the proportionality elements, 
determined that Parliament’s imposition of this limit does not fall within the range of 
options that would limit the right “as little as is reasonably necessary” and, therefore, is 
a disproportionate response.  This conclusion is consistent with the constitutional role 
of the courts under the Bill of Rights Act (to affirm, promote and protect human rights) 
to ensure the transparent of governmental decision-making that, in turn, enables parties 
to seek that the government be accountable for those decisions. While the courts are 
unable to strike down the limit McGrath J reminds us that if the courts find that a limit 
is a disproportionate response then:275 
 
It is then for the other branches of government to consider how to respond to 
the court’s finding.  While they are under no obligation to change the law and 
remedy the inconsistency, it is a reasonable constitutional expectation that 
there will be a reappraisal of the objectives of the particular measure, and of 
the means by which they were implemented in the legislation, in light of the 
finding of inconsistency with these fundamental rights and freedoms 
concerning which there is general consensus in New Zealand society and there 
are international obligations to affirm. 
 
This is why even when the courts may, from time to time, wander amongst the 
policy vegetable patch the courts do not undermine parliamentary sovereignty because 
it is the legislative branch that has the final say.  This is because s 5 of the Bill of 
Rights Act is subject to s 4, which means, ultimately, that the courts cannot override the 
limit.  Furthermore, the court’s decision adds to the democratic dialogue about the 
policy objectives Parliament pursues on behalf of New Zealand. 
D Prudent use of judicial deference and restraint 
The Supreme Court decision in Hansen establishes that analysis of limits under 
s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act is an essential part of determining such cases and that 
judicial deference will be used as a way of preserving comity, where it is called for, 
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between Parliament and the courts.  The application of judicial deference must not, 
however, undermine the constitutional role performed by the courts to the disadvantage 
of the people of New Zealand.  In order to establish if s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act 
applies, first you must establish that a limitation is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights 
Act because it is unjustified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act; circumventing the 
analysis under s 5 because the courts can not strike down legislation undermines the 
courts’ constitutional role to ensure the transparency of the public decision making 
reflected in passing legislation and protect and promote human rights.  Therefore, 
deference comes with a warning that it is to be used prudently and not to circumvent 
the analysis of the right, the objective of the limit, the effect of the limit and the 
alternative options. 
Judicial deference is a necessary part of the proportionality analysis and an 
important tool for maintaining the comity between the courts and Parliament when 
performing constitutional review.  The courts, and Crown counsel, need to be wary of 
lazy use of judicial deference so that public confidence in the human rights protections 
afforded by the Bill of Rights Act and the courts impartiality in reviewing the Crown’s 
actions is maintained in New Zealand.  The proportionality analysis should always be 
made where a legislative provision limits a right or freedom protected by the Bill of 
Rights Act; judicial deference to Parliament should not be used to shortcut analysis, for 
example, of whether the provision gives effect to an important and significant 
objective.  While the decision in Hansen provides some insight into the application of 
judicial deference questions remain about when and how judicial deference should be 
applied; this is a matter that has actively occupied the courts, members of Parliament, 
lawyers, officials, and academics alike.  
The principles in the dissenting decision of Laws LJ of the Canadian Supreme 
Court in International Transport Roth Gmbh v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department276 are often cited in academic writing as an example of the multi-factor 
approach to applying deference and are summarised by Rivers as the following four 
principles:277 
 
(1) greater deference should be paid to Parliament than to subordinate 
legislative or executive acts; (2) there is less scope for deference in the case of 
unqualified, or apparently unqualified rights; (3) greater deference should be 
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paid when a matter lies within the constitutional responsibility of the executive 
(eg defense of the realm) than within the constitutional responsibility of the 
courts (eg criminal justice); (4) greater deference should be paid where the 
question turns on matters of executive expertise (eg macro economic policy). 
 
While Laws LJ differed from colleagues in the outcome, Rivers observes that 
the reasoning in relation to deference did have the support of the Court.278 These 
factors have been added to, elaborated on, substituted, and singled out across academic 
and judicial writing.279 Each of these principles presents different challenges and no 
one principle, nor a combination of them, offers a complete response to the question of 
when the courts should defer to Parliament.  For example, as discussed by Rivers and 
Fredman, there are times when the topic of a case are peculiarly within the realm of 
both Parliament and the courts as exemplified by United Kingdom decision in A v 
Home Secretary in which national security (responsibility of the Executive) and right to 
fair trial (responsibility of the courts) meet.280  The Court of Appeal decision in 
Poumako is another example of how a case can occupy both spaces with equal 
intensity. 
An alternative approach that is currently gaining favour is to use two guiding 
principles: institutional competence and legitimacy.281 Rivers in “Proportionality and 
Variable Intensity of Review” takes these two guiding principles one-step further and 
distinguishes the nature of the judicial response according to the different principles.  
“Judicial deference” would apply when the courts defer to another’s decision on the 
basis of institutional competence, and “judicial restraint” applies when the courts are 
competent to make a decision but exercise restraint because such a decision may not be 
legitimate.282 These two guiding-principles are looked at in turn below. 
1 Principle of institutional capacity and judicial deference 
Insufficient institutional capacity or competence on the part of the courts is 
frequently cited as a reason why courts may need to exercise judicial deference to 
Parliament.  A comparison of the challenges courts face with those facing members of 
Parliament reveals that they appear to be manifestly the same. For example, regardless 
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of the forum, time pressures on parties are common and such time pressures affect the 
quality of the research including the collection, analysis, and comprehension of 
information and the reliability of the sources of that information resulting in a variable 
quality in the information presented to the courts and select committees alike.  
Likewise the variable expertise and experience of counsel is not limited to those 
appearing before the courts; it is also evident in government advisers and submitters 
before select committee – this is no way detracts from the conscientious efforts of those 
who participate in these forums, but reflects that people come from varied backgrounds 
with different experiences and training, and divergent views about the way in which 
something should be done.  For example, an expert witness before either forum may 
have considerable knowledge of an area of law or scientific research but be 
unaccustomed to presenting to a general audience in a non-technical manner.  There are 
very few parties appearing before the courts or select committee who have an “open 
cheque-book” and who do not, in some way, have to make the most of what they’ve 
got.   
The adversarial nature of court proceedings is often cited as an institutional 
constraint for the courts; however, it is important to realise that the House of 
Representatives determines the final formulation of legislation through debate and 
positional bargaining.  The adversarial nature of the judicial process arguably gives an 
added opportunity for the evidence to be tested by an independent decision-maker who 
does not represent a partial position.  As Tipping J’s target metaphor in Hansen 
suggests, the analysis by the courts is not to identify the “right” solution but to 
designate the range of options from which Parliament may legitimately select an 
outcome – this is the range of situations in which the judiciary may need to defer to 
Parliament.283 
In practice, it appears the institutional constraints faced by the courts are not too 
different from those of the House of Representatives.  Therefore, it is opportune to 
revisit the lack of institutional capacity argument and look instead at the respective 
institutional advantages of the courts and Parliament.  The obvious institutional 
advantage for members of Parliament is that they have more direct access to the public 
including public opinion on policy matters through the select committee process, 
electorate duties, and political party discussions.  Parliamentarians formulate their 
positions to reflect the values and views of sectors of the community on a policy 
problem. Their position is likely, however, to reflect a bias based on their political 
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party’s position and the position is likely to be the popular position and, in the case of 
the larger political parties, the majoritarian position.  Clayton in his article on judicial 
deference and the democratic dialogue theory284 recalls Cory J’s statement in Vriend v 
Alberta that “… we must remember that the concept of democracy is broader than the 
notion of majority rule, fundamental as that may be.”285   
The institutional advantage of the courts is that judges are practiced, 
independent and impartial decision-makers, insulated from popular political concerns. 
There is little mystery to policy analysis; in general, a policy should represent a 
proportionate solution to an identifiable problem in pursuit of a particular objective or 
outcome.  The designing of a proportionate solution should be based on evidence.  
These are all analytical skills that judges apply on a day-to-day basis: judges are 
professional decision-makers.   
While appealing to practical considerations, the principle of institutional 
competence places too much weight on the differences without acknowledging the 
similarities between parliamentary and judicial proceedings.  Undoubtedly, there may 
be situations in which institutional competence is material; however, the principle of 
institutional capacity is weak and leads the analysis away from the material issue before 
the courts: whether the limit is justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.  The 
institutional capacity weaknesses of the courts in constitutional review are already 
mitigated by the use of the purposive approach and their willingness to hear legislative 
fact evidence.   
Constitutional review of legislation presents an opportunity for the New 
Zealand public to get two bites of the democratic cherry: policy problems can be 
analysed in both a partial (Parliament) and impartial (the courts) environments and the 
constitutional cultural preference to retain Parliament as final decision-maker is 
preserved by s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act.  The principle of institutional capacity does 
not, however, help us determine when judicial deference should apply to review of 
legislation by the courts instead it offers us an insight into why the courts may need to 
exercise deference to Parliament. 
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2 Principle of legitimacy and judicial restraint 
The absence of a codified constitution means that the stable governance of New 
Zealand relies on comity between the courts and Parliament.286  This means that 
legitimacy to make a particular judicial decision, under the New Zealand constitution, 
is determined by both legal and political factors.  The “principle of legitimacy” in this 
context reflects the fact that while the courts may be competent to make a decision; 
direct access to the general public and accountability mechanisms in place may mean 
that Parliament is better placed to make the call in a particular case and the courts 
should exercise judicial restraint. 
The courts serve an invaluable role in a democracy as an impartial decision 
maker; the stability of a nation and its economic growth is often judged not only by its 
electoral, governance and regulatory systems but also the ability of the courts to 
administer justice effectively and impartially.  Justice Tipping’s observation in Hansen 
about the role of the courts to safeguard the rights of minorities is salient as it reminds 
us that constitutional review gives us benefit of both the representative policy making 
by Parliament and the impartiality of the courts to review that law for consistency with 
the Bill of Rights Act. 287 The volume of annual legislative amendments attests to the 
fact that the “perfect law” is a mythical creature and that law is the product of an 
iterative process that must adapt and change with the values and needs of the country. 
Ultimately, the final call about where the line should be drawn rests with Parliament by 
virtue of s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
Section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act clearly retains the ultimate position that 
Parliament alone has the final say on what the law should be; this is said to be a 
reflection of New Zealand’s preference for the representative and accountable decision-
making process rather than judicial process in matters of policy.288  However, because 
of s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act even if the judiciary finds that a limit is unjustified, the 
court cannot alter it and such a decisions will not result in the law being inoperable; 
therefore, there is no legal risk associated with a negative finding by the courts.  There 
may, however, be constitutional risks for the courts such as: loosing public confidence 
if the judicial decision and putting the executive and legislative branches in a tight spot 
highlighting the weaknesses in the policy which may strain the relationship between the 
courts and the other branches of government. 
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Therefore, it would be sensible for the courts to consider whether they may 
need to exercise judicial restraint when performing constitutional review for matters in 
which: the law or policy is a novel response to the problem that has not had much 
success with conventional solutions; the legislative response, while not offering the 
least infringement on the right, falls within the range of reasonable alternative policy 
options; or the law reflects the response to a polycentric policy matter (one for which 
there are competing views).289  These three situations are ones in which, in final step of 
weighing up the competing public interests under the proportionality test, the courts 
will have to consider whether to exercise judicial restraint; these situations should not 
act to circumvent the consideration of the limit through the proportionality test. 
The proportionality test should not be circumvented in cases in which the courts 
may need to exercise restraint because not only are the courts impartial decision-makers 
but they are also in a more powerful position than the public to compel Parliament to 
explain their actions:290 
 
At the very least, the appropriate judicial role in such a situation should be to 
require decision-makers to explain their decisions publicly.  This does not 
undermine democracy, but enhances it, strengthening accountability by 
exposing decisions to public scrutiny.   
 
The principle of legitimacy is a practical and useful guiding principle because it 
recognises that where constitutional values, such as human rights, are the subject of 
legal proceedings the outcome is not purely legal and restricted to the applicant but also 
have a political and social dimension. Caution must, however, be exercised to ensure 
that too much weight is not put on Parliament’s democratic role at the expense of the 
courts democratic role as a forum for increasing public scrutiny of decisions.  The 
principle of legitimacy does not offer a complete answer to when the courts may need 
to exercise deference or restraint. 
3 Proportionality test, intensity of review, and deference 
The guiding principles of institutional competence and legitimacy offer some 
assistance to understanding when the courts should apply deference or restraint but 
shift the focus away from the heart of issue: whether the limit is a justified limitation on 
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the right.  Despite the desirability of a clean and simple set of guiding principles for 
determining when judicial deference may be appropriate; this desire is naïve because, 
as can be observed from the decision in Hansen, the need for deference or restraint 
depends on the facts of the case and the seriousness of the effect of the limit on the 
right.  Rivers identifies the seriousness of the limitation on the right in question as a 
single characteristic for determining the intensity of review:291 
 
The doctrine of proportionality requires that the more seriously a right is 
limited, the greater must be the gain to the public interest to justify it.  Variable 
intensity of review states that the more seriously a right is limited, the more 
argument and evidence the court needs to be convinced that the justification is 
indeed as strong as it is alleged to be. 
 
This characteristic is also helpful for determining the degree to which the courts 
should exercise deference or restraint in a given case because it goes to the facts of the 
case and whether the limit is justified.  For example, the case for deference or restraint 
is less persuasive if the effect on the right is serious and the limit only represents a 
marginal gain for the public.   
In terms of when the principles of institutional competence and legitimacy 
should apply, Rivers considers that neither principle should be available for assessing 
the objective or purpose but that it may be appropriate for the other stages of the 
analysis.292 Given the essential role the courts play in ensuring transparency of 
democratic decision-making through performing constitutional review, a prudent path 
that would reserve consideration of whether deference or restraint is required until the 
final balancing of public interests is preferable.  The analysis of the elements of the 
important and significant objective and the reasonable policy alternatives can be 
established on a largely factual basis by examining the reasons behind the law, and 
identifying whether there are reasonable policy alternatives that may reduce the 
negative effect of a law on the right.   
The proportionality test, as observed by Rivers: “is not simply a legal device to 
assist judges in regulating legislative and executive incursions on rights.  It is better 
understood as a rational device for the optimisation of interests.” 293  Therefore, the 
final balancing of the public interests, which engages a more complex assessment of 
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values that are not purely legal values, is the most appropriate stage of the 
proportionality test to exercise deference or restraint - if the facts call for it.  Restricting 
this analysis to the final stage of the proportionality test acknowledges the role the 
courts play in New Zealand’s democracy and the necessary cooperative relationship 
between Parliament and the courts:294 
 
As a start the democratic process does not perform its function properly if 
decision-makers are under no duty to justify their decisions openly.  Equally 
importantly, the ability to remove leaders at an election is not a sufficient 
safeguard in cases in which the claim is that the rights of individuals must give 
was to the interests of the community. 
 
The pragmatic desire to utilise the respective institutional advantages of both 
Parliament and the courts as part of the democratic process in New Zealand requires a 
concession that judicial deference or restraint in the weighing up of the public interests 
may, depending on the facts, be necessary as part of the final step of the proportionality 
assessment.  
E Constitutional review and declarations of inconsistency 
The notable weakness of constitutional review of legislation under the Bill of 
Rights Act is the uncertainty about the remedies available if a legislative provision is 
found to be an unjustifiable limitation on a right in the Bill of Rights Act.  In other 
jurisdictions the courts can either strike down the limit (such as in Canada) or issue a 
declaration of inconsistency (such as in England).  In New Zealand, s 4 of the Bill of 
Rights Act expressly prohibits the striking down of legislation and the absence of a 
remedies clause in the Bill of Rights Act means that the remedies available in 
constitutional review are still unclear.  Nevertheless, declarations of inconsistency 
appear to be the most likely candidate for a remedy under constitutional review. 
A declaration of inconsistency is a declaration that legislation is inconsistent 
with a right or freedom contained in the Bill of Rights Act and the limit is not 
justifiable in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, (may also be called a “declaration of 
incompatibility”).  Declarations of inconsistency as a remedy have been on the mind of 
many a judge, lawyer, academic, public servant and, no doubt, politician. The 
arguments for and against the courts issuing declarations of inconsistency have been 
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described of as finely balanced and centre about the concepts of authority, procedural 
implications, use of judicial resources, and the preservation of comity between the 
courts and Parliament.  These arguments have been rehearsed on many occasions and 
while this chapter notes these arguments it does not seek to revisit those discussions; 
instead, this chapter examines whether a declaration of inconsistency may undermine 
the constitution by looking at the legal authority for declarations and the legitimacy of 
issuing such a declaration. 
A common challenge to whether declarations of inconsistency are a legitimate 
remedy is that the courts lack legal authority to issue such declarations.  For example, 
there is no provision in the Bill of Rights Act setting out that the courts have the power 
to issue declarations of inconsistency and, as some commentators and lawyers, have 
argued specific legislative authorisation would be necessary because of the procedural 
implications.295 In addition, because the Human Rights Act 1993 specifically provides 
for declarations of inconsistency to be issued under s 92J(2) of that Act but the Bill of 
Rights Act does not; some commentators and lawyers argue that this demonstrates that 
Parliament does not intend for the courts to have this power in relation to the rights and 
freedoms in the Bill of Rights Act.   
These arguments fail to acknowledge that the alternative that because the Bill of 
Rights Act is silent on the remedies that may be issued by the courts for breaches; the 
Act does not limit the ability of the courts to modify existing remedies or create new 
remedies using the common law.  While the remedies clause proposed in the White 
Paper was removed at the same time as the supreme law provision; this does not have 
the effect of overriding the common law principle that “where there is a right there is a 
remedy”.  This common law principle is an enduring one that Parliament would have 
needed to expressly override, and could have done so in similar terms to the 
preservation of legislative supremacy represented by section 4 of the Bill of Rights 
Act.296 In Baigent’s case compensation for breach of the Bill of Rights Act was 
awarded thereby creating as a new public law remedy under the Bill of Rights Act.297  
The Court of Appeal saw this development as essential:298   
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The Act is binding on us, and we would fail our duty if we did not give an 
effective remedy to a person whose legislatively affirmed rights have been 
infringed.  In a case such as the present the only effective remedy is 
compensation.  A mere declaration would be toothless.”  
 
While a declaration may have been considered toothless in that context because 
the involved the illegal actions of State officials, declarations do have their merits in 
the context of constitutional review.  The New Zealand Government decided, after 
considering the recommendations of the Law Commission, not to revoke the public law 
compensation remedy or to amend the Bill of Rights Act by expressly removing the 
ability for the courts to develop remedies for breaches of the Bill of Rights Act.299 
Declarations of inconsistency as a remedy have been discussed in some 
judgments; with the judgment in Moonen (No.1) generating optimism that such a 
remedy will be awarded.  In Moonen (No.1) Tipping J, for the court, observes: 300 
 
[Section 5] was, however, retained and should be regarded as serving some 
useful purpose, both in the present statutory context and in its other potential 
applications. That purpose necessarily involves the Court having the power, 
and on occasions the duty, to indicate that although a statutory provision must 
be enforced according to its proper meaning, it is inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights, in that it constitutes an unreasonable limitation on the relevant right or 
freedom which cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. [Emphasis added] 
 
This statement generated much excitement and enthusiasm that a “judicial 
indication” would be in the form of a declaration of inconsistency along those lines 
suggested by Brookfield in 1992.301  For example, Andrew Butler in an article 
published in 2000, weighs up the arguments for and against declarations of 
inconsistency concluding that they are finely balanced, in his view, in favour of such 
declarations and also observes:302 
 
Judicial indications of inconsistency will have a significant impact upon the 
current paradigm of the constitutional role and function of the judiciary putting 
significant practical power into the hands of the judges, even if nominally the 
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locus of legal power remains firmly with Parliament. … It will also bring 
about a new conceptualisation of the judicial role, one that will have to try to 
explain the advisory opinion an indication of inconsistency would involve. 
 
Despite this enthusiasm, which was shared by many lawyers and human rights 
advocates, the courts have yet to issue a declaration of inconsistency under the Bill of 
Rights Act.303  The closest the courts have come to issuing a declaration is the decision 
of Thomas J in Poumako in which he alone issues a declaration.  While the Court of 
Appeal in Poumako appears to have accepted that declarations of inconsistency can be 
issued; the majority decided not to issue a declaration in that case.  The general 
comments about the issuing of declarations of inconsistency from Thomas J in 
Poumako are insightful when considering the legitimacy of the jurisdiction, for 
example Thomas J, like Tipping J, makes a connection between s 5 of the Bill of Rights 
Act and declarations of inconsistency representing them as essential bedfellows:  
 
The Bill of Rights was enacted to affirm fundamental rights and s 5 must be 
given a genuine role in relation to the interpretation of statutes. That role can 
be given effect to by the judiciary, and a declaration is the logical vehicle for 
doing so when such a course is required.304 
 
The High Court in Zaoui v Attorney-General (Zaoui 2004)305 and Reid v 
Minister of Labour (Reid)306 referred to the Court of Appeal decisions in Moonen 
(No.1) and Poumako as establishing authority for declarations of inconsistency, though 
in both of the High Court cases they determined it was not material to the outcome.  In 
describing this authority, for example, Judge Williams in Zaoui states that:307 
 
…The main reason for taking that view is that this Court is bound by decisions 
of the Court of Appeal which, while not actually making a declaration of 
inconsistency, nonetheless clearly conclude jurisdiction exists. The cases 
include Moonen …where the Court of Appeal set out a five-step test for 
determining inconsistency with BoRA including a final step in which clearly 
indicate courts may issue a declaration of inconsistency. … And in R v 
                                                 
303 Putting declarations issued by the Human Rights Review Tribunal’s under the Human Rights Act 
1993. 
304 Poumako, above n 57, at [97] per Thomas J. 
305 Zaoui v Attorney-General & Anor [2004] 2 NZLR 339 [Zaoui (2004)]. 
306 Reid v Minister of Labour [2005] NZAR 125. 
307 Zaoui (2004), above n 305, at [166]. 
 
90 
Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 the majority gave serious consideration to 
making a declaration of inconsistency with BoRA… 
 
The Crown’s position in relation to declarations of inconsistency is somewhat 
elusive.  In Baigent’s case the judgment of Hardie-Boys J notes that: “the Solicitor-
General accepted that the Court could make a declaration that particular actions were in 
breach of its own provisions.”308  While the Solicitor-General accepted this position in 
the respect of this case and the actions of State officials; subsequent Crown counsel 
have argued against this jurisdiction in relation to legislative provisions instead 
submitting that s 4 acts as a barrier to this jurisdiction.309  The counter to this argument 
is that s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act expressly sets out what the courts cannot do 
(invalidate or decline to apply a provision) and does not prohibit the issuing of 
declarations of inconsistency.  For example, in his dissenting decision in Poumako, 
Justice Thomas states:310 
 
It does not contravene the prohibition in s 4. .... Rather, it would serve to 
advance the very purposes of the Bill of Rights in that it would make it clear 
that a statutory provision of the kind in issue is clearly contrary to those 
objectives. 
 
In contrast to the orthodox view of the courts that would see them not engaging 
on constitutional review of legislation because it encroaches on Parliament’s law-
making domain, it has been observed that being able to issue declarations of 
inconsistency would complement the courts’ role under s 5 and is a practical judicial 
companion to reports issued by the Attorney-General under s 7 of the Bill of Rights 
Act.311  Butler and Butler observe that this is particularly the case for legislation that 
predates the Bill of Rights Act.   Another argument often advanced in favour of 
declarations of inconsistency is that s 5 would be redundant without such a remedy.312  
This is a less convincing argument given the broader constitutional role of the courts 
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pursuant to s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act: to promote transparency of parliamentary 
decisions. 
Nevertheless, Judge McKenzie in Reid, like Judge Williams in Zaoui 
considered declarations of inconsistency to be a remedy of “last resort”. 313 Claudia 
Geiringer in her paper “An Update on Implied Declarations of Inconsistency and the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act”314 examines five recent cases for their contribution to 
the development of this remedy and concludes while the decision in Hansen affirms 
that the courts have jurisdiction to review legislation for consistency with the Bill of 
Rights Act: “[t]he prospects for a formal remedial jurisdiction are, however, poor.”315   
Geiringer reminds us that while the debate about whether courts can, and 
should, issue declarations of inconsistency is an abstract argument and that the 
procedural implications of such declarations limit the possibility of them being issued. 
Geiringer’s paper identifies several procedural implications that need to be clarified by 
the courts and notes their approaches to them to date.  For example, the Court of 
Appeal decisions in the Boscawen cases316 informs us that declarations cannot be 
issued in situations involving abstract review of legislation or covered by parliamentary 
privilege.317  A plaintiff also needs to seek a declaration of inconsistency early in the 
proceedings to ensure that the earlier courts have the benefit of complete arguments 
from both sides.318  Whether declarations of inconsistency can be issued by District 
Courts or as part of criminal proceedings are also murky issues. 319  
These procedural complexities are sometimes cited as a reason why express 
legislative authority is required.320 An alternative view is that the practical implications 
identified by Geiringer above all suggest that the courts appear to be formulating the 
procedural requirements for declarations of inconsistency incrementally. It is desirable 
that the courts have a meaningful remedy for constitutional review and, to this end, if 
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we want declarations of inconsistency as a remedy anytime soon then New Zealand 
may, as identified by Geiringer, need to legislate for it.321 
In summary, while the arguments around legal authority appear to be 
inconclusive when viewed in a strictly legal sphere; the constitution permits 
consideration of other factors.  For example, despite the litigation strategies advanced 
by Crown counsel, the New Zealand Government in its Fourth Period Report to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee listed, at paragraph 12, declarations of 
incompatibility as a remedy for a breach of the Bill of Rights Act citing the decision in 
Moonen as the source of the recent development and noting the minority declaration in 
Poumako in the Report.322  Not only has the government not moved to restrict the 
ability of the courts to develop remedies under the Bill of Rights Act; it has noted 
developments as positive endorsements of New Zealand’s compliance with 
international human right standards.  The Firth Periodic Report suggests that the 
extension of this jurisdiction to the Human Rights Review Tribunal for discrimination 
matters is to ensure that the Tribunal, whose jurisdiction is governed by legislation 
rather than a combination of legislation and common law, is a complementary 
amendment intended to ensure that the Tribunal could also exercise this power. 323 
As with the question of whether it is legitimate the courts should review 
legislation under the Bill of Rights Act the legitimacy of the courts issuing declarations 
of inconsistency is also frequently debated when analysing the merits of such a remedy 
for unjustified breaches of the Bill of Rights Act.  The legitimacy of the courts issuing 
declarations of inconsistency again goes to the heart of the evolving role of the courts 
and their contribution to the affirmation and protection of human rights. For example, 
Crown counsel in Poumako and Boscawen submitted that if the courts were to issue a 
declaration of inconsistency then it would upset the “delicate relationship” between the 
courts and Parliament.324 
Issuing a declaration seems a natural conclusion to a finding that a legislative 
provision is an unjustified limit on a right.  And yet, the courts seem reluctant to issue 
one.  This is evident from the Supreme Court’s decision in Hansen, despite a majority 
reaching the conclusion that s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act is an unjustified 
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limitation on the right to be presumed innocent as affirmed in s 25(c) of the Bill of 
Rights Act and that the provision must stand and be applied by virtue of s 4 of the Bill 
of Rights Act.  As Geiringer notes in her update on declarations of inconsistency, the 
appellant’s counsel had requested in their written submissions that the Supreme Court 
issue a declaration but the judges do not discuss the question of declaratory relief in the 
decision.325   
The reluctance of the courts to issue declarations of inconsistency appears to 
hinge on a wariness of upsetting the orthodox view unless the matter severely impinges 
on the Bill of Rights Act and the constitution, or if the limitation is oppressive of a 
wide cross-section of society.  While the issuing of declarations of inconsistency may 
challenge the orthodox view it does not undermine the constitution instead it is a way 
of balancing the institutional weakness of Parliament and using the institutional 
advantages of the courts:326 
 
When the Courts issue a declaration of inconsistency, parliamentary 
sovereignty is left intact: the Courts are not refusing to apply the legislation, as 
that would be tantamount to usurping parliamentary sovereignty.  Parliament 
retains supreme authority to dictate changes to legal policy. 
 
As identified by Conte and Wynn-Williams, declarations of inconsistency are a 
mechanism for informing Parliament that it has fallen short of the legislative standards 
it has set out in the Bill of Rights Act.327  Furthermore, the use of declarations of 
inconsistency, rather than subverting the objective of the legislative provision by 
reading down the limit, is a demonstration of judicial deference to the law-making role 
of Parliament: 328  
 
… the fundamental constitutional principle of judicial independence exists to 
ensure that this function is impartially and fearlessly exercised. In being 
judicially circumspect to the legislative primacy of Parliament, therefore, the 
courts must guard against being too sensitive to the supposed reaction of that 
institution when exercising the judicial function. This judicial independence is 
not, of course, antithetical to Parliament’s legislative sovereignty. As already 
emphasised, Parliament can pass legislation to overrule the courts. Indeed, 
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following a declaration of the kind I envisage, Parliament can choose to leave 
the proscribed provision in place, or even to reinforce it. That choice is 
Parliament’s prerogative. Its legislative sovereignty remains intact. 
 
An argument can also be made that the courts, in issuing a declaration of 
inconsistency, are essentially giving a particular person or sector of the community an 
extra and, therefore, undemocratic vote in the matter.329  Fredman has a different take 
on this in relation to the UK Human Rights Act, instead characterising declarations of 
inconsistency in terms of deliberative democracy:330 
 
The HRA can be characterised in terms of deliberative democracy.  On the one 
hand, because judges have no power to invalidate legislation, a decision in 
favour of an excluded group is not a veto over representative decision-making.  
Instead the effect of a judicial decision is to signal to legislators that the 
political process should be re-opened.  
 
Such a declaration gives Parliament the opportunity “to make a deliberative, 
authoritative, and informed decision whether to address a legislative incursion on 
fundamental rights and freedoms.” 331 
A more controversial question is perhaps not whether the courts can and should 
issue declarations of inconsistency but whether they are under a duty to do so.332 For 
example, could a decision be challenged for not issuing a declaration of inconsistency?  
This is a question for another paper and is a challenging one because the evolving 
constitutional role of the courts could see this question being addressed presently or not 
for another decade depending on the nature of cases that comes before it; unless this is 
a matter that the government will be considering as part of its review of constitutional 
arrangements in which case it could be resolved in the near future.333  
It is noteworthy that Parliament has not enacted an amendment to the Bill of 
Rights Act clearly stating, in similar terms to s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act, that 
declarations of inconsistency are not permitted:334 
 
                                                 
329 Fredman “From Deference to Democracy”, above n 279, at 69-70. 
330 Fredman “From Deference to Democracy”, above n 279, at 70. 
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332 Ibid, at 253-254. 
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Irrespective of whether declaration of inconsistency are seen as contrary to 
Parliament’s intention, in Diceyan constitutional terms, it is of course open to 
Parliament to limit or override the Judge-made law which emerges from the 
Courts. 
 
Despite the rumblings in various judgments over the last 10 years about the 
possibility of such a remedy being plausible, no action to amend the Bill of Rights Act 
has been taken.  The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 as a response to the decision in 
Ngati Apa v Attorney-General335 is a clear and relatively recent example of Parliament 
taking just such action where they consider that the courts should not have jurisdiction 
to consider some matters. In the case of the Bill of Rights Act, however, the 
Government of the day has instead noted such declarations as potential remedy in 
reports about New Zealand’s compliance with international human rights standards to 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 
When contemplating whether such declarations are necessary or make a 
difference; bear in mind the fact, as observed by Geiringer in her update, that a 
declaration of inconsistency changes the “winner” of the case to that of the applicant: 
“This has, most significantly, costs implications, as well, perhaps, as implications for 
the availability of legal aid.  It would therefore have a significant impact on the 
practical availability of the remedy.”336  Furthermore, the declaration would have the 
effect of promoting the right within New Zealand and acting as guidance to the 
executive and legislative branches about what intrusions are unlikely to be justified and 
to improve the rigours of the policy work to ensure such intrusions are indeed 
supported by evidence and clear reasoning not simply an automatic, panicked, or 
popular response to a policy problem. 
Therefore, in light of the incremental approach taken by the courts in 
developing the remedy of declarations of inconsistency, the common law heritage for 
developing remedies to rights, the attitude of the government to the remedy, together 
with the fact that the government has not amended the Bill of Rights Act to remove the 
ability for the courts to issue declarations of inconsistency it would appear that the 
courts can legitimately issue declarations of inconsistency as a constitutional review 
remedy.  
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IV NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM 
The analysis of the legal authority and how the courts perform constitutional 
review reveals that while it challenges the orthodox position, it is consistent with the 
constitution and does not undermine the Parliament’s position as the ultimate law-
maker or its ability to make and unmake laws.  It is, therefore, timely to revisit the 
orthodox view because not only does constitutional review of legislation not undermine 
Parliament but also constitutional review is part of constitutional evolution that will see 
the strengthening of democracy in New Zealand.  New Zealand appears ready to shed 
the orthodox view for a more transparent and sophisticated model of legislative 
accountability than that that offered by periodic general elections.  It is essential to 
recall that cases are bought by people who disagree with the law; the courts are not self 
referring and review of legislation is not performed in the abstract.  The courts are 
another way for people to challenge the legitimacy of laws without, in the case of the 
Bill of Rights Act, undermining the application of those laws and maintaining New 
Zealand’s constitutional norm of a strong representative democracy.337  As noted 
earlier, Palmer describes New Zealand constitutional culture as having three values: 
egalitarianism, authoritarianism, and pragmatism; these values offer a sound basis for 
considering a different constitutional paradigm for New Zealand.338 
1 Conceptual weakness with the orthodox view 
The orthodox view of parliamentary sovereignty is itself afflicted by many of 
the conceptual challenges that constitutional review of legislation faces – particularly in 
that it has both legal and political dimensions:339 
 
In spite of the law of written constitutional limits on the United Kingdom 
Parliament, it has long been recognised that there are certain measures that it 
would be politically impossible to adopt and whose enactment would, 
therefore, never be attempted. 
 
This observation by Elliot, in relation to the United Kingdom, highlights that the law-
making power of Parliament is not “unlimited” in a constitutional sense; it is subject to 
non-legal limitations.  The orthodox view of the doctrine of parliamentary 
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sovereignty’s focuses on the form of the law; that is by virtue of Parliament passing a 
law it is valid.340 A law passed by Parliament is valid because it is made of 
democratically elected representatives who are intended to reflect the views and values 
of the people.  This view is somewhat simplistic, however, as it overlooks the fact that 
democracy is not just a mode of governance but also a reflection of values (such as 
equality) and that there are essential substantive elements to democracy. 
It is plausible that the rise and stability of representative democracy in common 
law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, 
during the late 19th century and early 20th century saw, initially at least, a reduced need 
for this protective function by the courts that was served by common law principles 
such as the Bonham principle.341  However, there seems to be an increasing willingness 
by the courts to perform “value driven” review.342  Jeffrey Jowell in writing about the 
United Kingdom, attributes the increase of review of legislation and review of 
administrative decisions to a desire to place limits on government’s power and that this 
desire is a reaction to “the great tyrannies of the 20th century [that] had already 
demonstrated the dangers of unconfined power, regardless of whether it was sanctioned 
by popular consent.”343  
Constitutional review is a new area and the parameters of the theory in New 
Zealand are still fluid and as Joseph concludes in his discussion of constitutional 
review:  “Recognition of the new grounds would promote the courts’ practices openly, 
with broad acceptance, and would infect our public law with greater ethical and moral 
content.”344  In a later article about judicial indications of inconsistency Andrew Butler 
discusses the Court of Appeal’s decision in Moonen (No 1).345  In the course of this 
article, Butler locates Moonen (No 1) in modern New Zealand public law discourse 
focusing on Rishworth’s estimation, in 1996, that the Bill of Rights Act would mark a 
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shift in the emphasis of public law346 and draws attention to Joseph’s discussion of 
constitutional review: 347 
 
In a recent challenging paper Phillip Joseph has traced the beginnings of a new 
constitutional review paradigm in New Zealand, which is “values driven” and 
substantive, aimed at vindicating basic constitutional and human rights 
standards.  This can be contrasted with the traditional approach, which has 
concentrated on process. ... In my view, if the Court of Appeal follows through 
with the concept of “judicial indications of inconsistency” we will be 
witnessing a profound paradigm shift in New Zealand public law discourse 
that builds upon the elements identified by both Rishworth and Joseph. 
 
While some commentators observe with these developments gentle anticipation, 
there is disquiet amongst others about the developing jurisdiction of constitutional 
review.  For example, Ekins asks whether New Zealand is in the middle of a quiet 
revolution lead by an activist judiciary to limit the government’s power and whether 
the courts are the appropriate body to lead such a revolution.348  The debate about the 
constitutionality of such review is often made in binary terms: parliamentary 
sovereignty versus judicial supremacy.  The United States of America is an example of 
judicial supremacy in which the courts have the final say:349 
 
The Bill of Rights gives the US Supreme Court the final word on the issues 
that come before it.  As the Supreme Court stressed in Marbury v Madison “it 
is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what 
the law is”.  …  A rule of the Supreme Court cannot be superseded by 
legislation enacted by Congress (however controversial): but requires a 
constitutional amendment. 
 
 Canada is described as having a “weaker” form of judicial supremacy because 
while the courts can strike down legislation that is inconsistent with the Canadian 
Charter, Parliament can expressly reserve its position under s 33 of the Canadian 
Charter for some rights, and the courts must also apply a justified limitations test under 
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s 1 of the Canadian Charter.350  In contrast, New Zealand has a Bill of Rights Act that 
expressly preserves legislative supremacy.   
In relation to the New Zealand courts and judicial activism, Hon Dr Michael 
Cullen asserted that if constitutional change is to occur then it should be the subject of a 
democratic process with broad public involvement rather than through judicial 
development of constitutional law that would see the application of a higher law 
approach in constitutionally significant areas.351  Petra Butler’s article “Human Rights 
and Parliamentary Sovereignty in New Zealand” provides an alternative perspective 
about whether the courts are taking an activist approach to human rights cases thereby 
impinging on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.352  Judicial activism is defined, 
in the article, as a judge drawing on his or her moral, political, or religious views as to 
what the law should be. Petra Butler concludes that courts have not deprived 
Parliament of its sovereignty353 and that “the courts role has become more overtly that 
of Parliament’s partner in law making.”354 
The binary approach of legislative supremacy versus judicial supremacy is 
unsophisticated and fails to acknowledge the complementary relationship between 
Parliament and the courts; especially, given s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act expressly 
retains the legislative and democratic mandate of Parliament.   It is necessary, 
therefore, to develop a paradigm that better describes the productive relationship 
between the courts and Parliament.   
2 Alternative paradigms for the relationship between Parliament and the courts  
In practical terms, the orthodox view is no longer supportable in the New 
Zealand context due, in part, to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hansen that 
definitively establishes the courts role to review legislation for consistency with the Bill 
of Rights Act.  This role has not been contradicted by a legislative amendment to the 
Bill of Rights Act; instead the mode of analysis has been employed by the government 
to assess whether draft legislation is consistent with the Bill of Rights Act.  If the 
orthodox view is no longer supportable then the two obvious starting points for 
alternative paradigms are Joseph’s collaborative enterprise framework and Hogg and 
Bushell’s dialogue theory.  Before examining these theories it is important to recall that 
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any such alternative, in relation to the Bill of Rights Act, has a set parameter: the courts 
cannot override or refuse to apply a provision simply because it is an unjustified 
limitation on a right (s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act).  This parameter reflects two of New 
Zealand’s enduring constitutional cultural values: egalitarianism and 
authoritarianism.355 
In 1997, Hogg and Bushell set out to confront the anti-majoritarian objection to 
the legitimacy of review of legislation under the Canadian Charter and also developed a 
new paradigm for examining the relationship between Parliament and the courts: the 
dialogue theory. While the design of the Bill of Rights Act was influenced by the 
Canadian Charter there are a differences between the two instruments the material one, 
in this instance, is that the courts in Canada have the power to strike down legislation 
that places an unjustified limitation on the rights and freedoms contained in the 
Canadian Charter.  Nevertheless, the similarities make it useful to examine the dialogue 
theory as this theory has been used to describe the relationship between the courts and 
Parliament in other common law jurisdictions.  This theory offers a non-legal 
description of the relationship between Parliament and the courts in relation to 
promoting human rights and democratic values.  The hypothesis that Hogg and Bushell 
worked with was that:356 
 
…while the Charter would often influence the design of legislation that 
encroached on a guaranteed right, it would "rarely [raise] an absolute barrier to 
the wishes of the democratic institutions." Legislatures would retain the 
primary responsibility for social and economic policy, and would usually be 
able to accomplish what they wanted to do while respecting the requirements 
of the Charter. 
 
In essence, when a court strikes down legislation it is said to be starting a 
dialogue with Parliament about where the balance lies between the right and the public 
interest in pursuing a particular policy objective.  Hogg and Bushell examined all the 
relevant decisions and concluded that a court’s decision is not "the last word" and that: 
“while the Charter had given judges considerable authority to curtail legislative actions 
that impinged on protected rights and freedoms, it had by no means ousted majoritarian 
will. 357   
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The dialogue theory has subsequently generated much discussion and debate 
and in 2007 the Osgoode Hall Law Journal invited the authors and other academics and 
commentators to contribute to a further examination of the theory.  As part of this the 
original authors, joined by Wright, reviewed further decisions by the Supreme Court of 
Canada to strike down legislation and examined the critique of the dialogue theory.  
They concluded that the anti-majoritarian objection remains a weak one given the way 
in which Parliament and the courts respond to such decisions, and observed five ways 
in which the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada have employed the dialogue 
theory such as invoking the idea of dialogue to justify judicial review and to oppose the 
reading down of legislation in a Canadian Charter case.358  Reference of the dialogue 
theory by the courts reflects a desire to find a better way of describing the relationship 
between Parliament and the courts because the courts have had to evolve in response to 
legislative measures taken by Parliament to improve the observance of human rights 
standards and democratic values.  This desire is not limited to Canada it is also present 
in case law from the United Kingdom and New Zealand where, although there is no 
power to strike down legislation, the courts are performing a role in which they critique 
Parliament thus bringing them into competition with the orthodox view. 
In his article “Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise”, Joseph 
seeks to discover the true nature of the relationship between Parliament and the courts, 
and expressly rejects the binary construction of parliamentary supremacy versus 
judicial supremacy instead relying on the concept of a collaborative enterprise in which 
the roles of the respective institutions in the business of government are interdependent 
but remain independent.359  Joseph rejects the normative force of the language of 
“sovereignty” and “supremacy” and asserts that neither branch is supreme over the 
other.360 Instead, Joseph identifies that although Parliament and the courts gain their 
legitimacy through different means (Parliament through representative democracy and 
the courts through the constitution and common law) their goal is the same: “[t]he 
continuing mutual respect and goodwill between these branches vouchsafe liberties and 
freedoms in a representative democracy.”361   
Nevertheless, some prudence is required because while the concept of 
“sovereignty” and “supremacy” appears outmoded, the kernel of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty that places Parliament as the ultimate lawmaker is still at the 
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heart our constitutional arrangements due to our constitutional cultural values of 
egalitarianism and authoritarianism.  The material change bought by constitutional 
review of legislation reflects a third constitutional cultural value: pragmatism.  This is 
because constitutional review presents an invaluable avenue for the public to challenge 
Parliament’s direction when they disagree with the position Parliament has taken.  It is 
an opportunity to hold Parliament accountable for its choices and to ensure 
transparency of decision-making.  This avenue is necessary to counteract the 
institutional weakness of Parliament (majority rule) using the institutional advantages 
of the courts (impartial and independent decision making).  The outcome of a judicial 
decision that a legislative provision is an unjustified limitation does not have direct 
legal consequences; it has political consequences.  This is a reflection of our current 
legal and constitutional context; Joseph’s collaborative enterprise framework does, 
however, recognise iterative constitutional growth and reflect New Zealand’s 
continuing incremental movement towards a constitutional model that places 




Despite the differing views about the legitimacy of the courts performing 
review of legislation, the courts have been reviewing legislation under the auspices of s 
5 of the Bill of Rights Act without intervention of Parliament. Moreover, as this paper 
demonstrates, constitutional review of legislation can be performed consistently with 
the constitution.  The courts largely perform their role within the orthodox view when 
interpreting the right and assessing the nature of the infringement of the limit on the 
right.  There are, nonetheless, aspects of constitutional review of legislation that 
encroach on the orthodox view particularly when the courts assess whether the 
objective is important and significant, whether there are alternative policy options, and 
whether the paramount balance has been struck between the competing public interests 
in applying the proportionality analysis.  This encroachment does not, however, 
undermine the ability for Parliament to make and unmake laws or result in the striking 
down of legislation by the courts; Parliament’s position at the apex of the constitutional 
structure is retained by virtue of section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act.362 Furthermore, the 
cautious use of proportionality analysis, and judicial deference and restraint will ensure 
that comity between the courts and Parliament is maintained. 
Constitutional review of legislation is an integral part of achieving the purpose 
of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act: to promote a culture of justification and accountability 
in relation to the democratic values the New Zealand has enacted in the Bill of Rights 
Act.  It is a means of the New Zealand public challenging Parliament and seeking it to 
reconsider, using an actual instance of a rights infringement, the legal position it has 
taken on a policy matter.  While this is a new role or the courts; it is not an unfamiliar 
one and is an extension of the current practices of judicial review of administrative 
decisions.  Judicial review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act is, therefore, not 
only “constitutional” but is instrumental in furthering the goals of democracy, 
particularly in the absence of a codified constitution because the values protected by the 
rights in the Bill of Rights Act are democratic values: one of the substantive 
constitutional benchmarks against which Parliament’s decisions should be measured.   
While judicial deference and restraint to Parliament has a role to play in judicial 
decision-making to preserve comity between the courts and Parliament; it should not be 
used to circumvent the proportionality analysis.  The courts should be encouraged to 
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issue declarations of inconsistency so that constitutional review of legislation can have 
a meaningful remedy to advance greater debate about the merits of a particular political 
response to a social or legal problem (although encouragement may need to come in the 
form of legislation if desired sooner rather than later).  
Not only is New Zealand’s constitution the result of pragmatic evolution; it also 
reflects the characteristics of New Zealanders themselves, as described by Michael 
King in Penguin History of New Zealand:363 
 
…most New Zealanders, whatever their cultural background, are good-hearted, 
practical, commonsensical and tolerant.  Those qualities are part of the national 
character that has in the past saved this country from the worst excesses of 
chauvinism and racism seen in other parts of the world.  They are as sound a 
basis as any for optimism about the country’s future. 
 
Constitutional review of legislation under the Bill of Rights Act is a pragmatic 
response to a growing desire to improve the transparency of decision-making by 
Parliament. Constitutional review of legislation reflects not only the constitutional 
value of pragmatism it also it sees a shift towards a more sophisticated form of 
representative democracy in which the views of minority or marginalised groups can be 
given an airing when a law has a disproportionate effect them without undermining 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
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